State of Tennessee v. Travis Dewayne Gipson
E2015-01273-CCA-R3-CD
| Tenn. Crim. App. | Aug 19, 2016Background
- Travis Dewayne Gipson pled guilty (June 2, 2014) to two counts of delivery of > .5 grams of cocaine in a drug-free zone in exchange for concurrent 20-year sentences, 12 years at 100%; a third Blount County charge (and its mandatory consecutive exposure) was dismissed as part of the plea.
- Nine days later Gipson moved to withdraw his pleas, alleging coercion, conflict of interest within the public defender’s office, and ineffective assistance; he later filed a pro se motion claiming counsel collusion with the prosecutor.
- At the withdrawal hearing, prosecutor explained Gipson faced up to 40 years at 100% in Blount and additional exposure in Knox County if convicted at trial; trial counsel had reviewed videos/photos and attended another informant-based trial where the informant was credited.
- Gipson testified counsel pressured him to accept the plea, told him he would not have an appeal if he went to trial, and that he was not in the right frame of mind during the Rule 11 colloquy.
- Trial counsel denied telling Gipson he would forfeit appeals, described thorough preparation, and said Gipson accepted after reviewing evidence and calling family; competency and plea-colloquy transcripts supported voluntariness.
- The trial court found no conflict of interest or manifest injustice, credited counsel, found Gipson competent, and denied the motion; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Gipson's Argument | State's/Prosecution's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Gipson established "manifest injustice" warranting plea withdrawal | Plea was coerced, involuntary, entered without effective counsel; conflict within public defender’s office required different counsel | Plea was knowing, voluntary, and resulted from reasonable advice and global negotiation that benefited Gipson | Denied — no manifest injustice shown; plea was knowing and voluntary |
| Whether a conflict of interest in public defender’s office deprived Gipson of effective assistance | Heated exchange with original counsel created an office-wide conflict; private counsel appointment for one case showed a conflict | No proof of an actual conflict affecting trial counsel; public defender transition explained innocently; no prejudice shown | Denied — record did not demonstrate an actual conflict or resulting prejudice |
| Whether trial counsel’s statements about appeals rendered plea unknowing/involuntary | Counsel told Gipson he would have no appeal if he went to trial, which coerced acceptance and impaired voluntariness | Trial counsel denied making such statements; court implicitly credited counsel; Gipson answered plea colloquy questions and was competent | Denied — court credited counsel; plea colloquy and competency evaluation support voluntariness |
| Whether negotiating all three cases together was improper given private counsel in one case | Joint negotiation coerced Gipson to plead to avoid mandatory consecutive exposure; separate counsel should have negotiated | Dismissal of one charge was part of the favorable global resolution; no evidence negotiations were improper or prejudicial | Denied — record shows a beneficial global plea and no impropriety proven |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Crowe, 168 S.W.3d 731 (Tenn. 2005) (standards and examples for withdrawing guilty pleas to correct manifest injustice)
- State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436 (Tenn. 2010) (abuse-of-discretion review of plea-withdrawal denials)
- State v. Mellon, 118 S.W.3d 340 (Tenn. 2003) (standards for plea withdrawal)
- State v. Jordan, 325 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2010) (abuse-of-discretion principles)
- State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136 (Tenn. 2007) (consideration of relevant factors in plea-withdrawal decisions)
- State v. McClintock, 732 S.W.2d 268 (Tenn. 1987) (Rule 11 and plea-acceptance procedures)
- State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1977) (plea-acceptance rules)
- State v. Nagele, 353 S.W.3d 112 (Tenn. 2011) (when court’s failure to advise of sentencing consequences can constitute manifest injustice)
- Ray v. State, 451 S.W.2d 854 (Tenn. 1970) (plea withdrawal not warranted by mere change of heart)
- Clenny v. State, 576 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978) (satisfaction of plea withdrawal standards; harsh sentence alone insufficient)
- State v. Turner, 919 S.W.2d 346 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (courts must assess circumstances when determining manifest injustice)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence can invalidate a plea if it influenced entry of plea)
