555 S.W.3d 494
Tenn.2018Background
- Tennessee law (pre-2018) imposed a $250 BADT (blood alcohol or drug concentration test) fee on convictions for certain offenses when the defendant had submitted to chemical or TBI-calibrated breath testing; fees were deposited into a TBI Intoxicant Testing Fund earmarked for TBI use.
- Decosimo provided a blood sample; TBI toxicology testing showed BAC 0.16%. She was charged with DUI per se and other offenses. She pleaded nolo contendere to DUI per se and reserved a certified question challenging the BADT-fee statute.
- Defendants argued the statute created an appearance of impropriety: TBI forensic scientists and the TBI institution had financial incentives to produce results that lead to convictions (and thus fees), undermining due process and impartial tribunals.
- Evidence at hearing: TBI testimony and documents showing BADT fee revenues and TBI expenditures; TBI salaried forensic scientists; one prior laboratory error that led to dismissal and mass retesting; BADT fees historically funded various TBI operations.
- Trial court denied suppression/dismissal but allowed a jury instruction about the statutory incentive; Court of Criminal Appeals held the statute violated due process (analogy to contingent-fee bias for experts) and suppressed the results. Tennessee Supreme Court granted permission to appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Decosimo's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the BADT-fee statute creates a due process violation by giving TBI forensic scientists a financial incentive to bias test results / appearance of impropriety | Statute earmarks fees to TBI and conditions fees on conviction, creating personal/institutional pecuniary interests that undermine impartiality and create appearance of bias | Tumey/Ward/Connally neutrality rules apply only to judicial/quasi-judicial actors; TBI scientists are salaried technicians with no control over prosecutions or fee allocation, so any interest is remote | Court rejects challenge: Tumey/Ward/Connally apply to judicial/quasi-judicial officials; TBI scientists are not such officials and have no direct personal pecuniary interest; any institutional interest is too remote to violate due process |
| Whether the Tennessee Constitution affords broader protection here than the Fourteenth Amendment | State provision should be read more broadly to forbid the appearance of institutional financial incentives | No persuasive textual or historical basis to diverge; precedent treats state and federal due process similarly here | Court declines to extend greater protection under Tennessee Constitution |
| Whether the statute is analogous to expert-witness contingency-fee disqualifications | BADT-fee earmark is functionally same as paying experts contingent fees, creating bias | TBI forensic scientists are salaried and not paid per-case; statute does not create expert contingency-fee arrangement | Court holds the analogy fails; BADT statute is not a contingency-fee scheme for experts |
| Whether suppression of TBI test results is required as remedy | Appearance of bias requires suppression to protect fair-trial right | No structural due-process error shown; suppression not warranted | Court reverses CCA and reinstates trial-court judgment; suppression/dismissal improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (a judge’s direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in convictions violates due process)
- Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (official’s executive responsibility for municipal finances deriving from fines creates unconstitutional risk/appearance of bias)
- Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (non-salaried magistrate’s financial dependence on issuing warrants violates due process)
- Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980) (Tumey/Ward neutrality rules apply to judicial/quasi-judicial officers and not to prosecutorial/enforcement actors; different standards for enforcement officials)
- Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993) (distinction between adjudication and enforcement disposes of Tumey-based bias claims)
- Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) (pecuniary interests of some decisionmakers too remote to violate due process)
- Swafford v. Harris, 967 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn. 1998) (discussing disqualification where an expert’s contingent-fee arrangement creates improper bias)