State of Tennessee v. Noura Jackson
444 S.W.3d 554
| Tenn. | 2014Background
- Noura Jackson was tried for first-degree premeditated murder of her mother (June 2005); jury convicted her of second-degree murder based entirely on circumstantial evidence and sentenced to 20 years, 9 months.
- Jackson did not testify at trial; defense rested without calling witnesses and focused on impeachment, alternate-perpetrator theories, and investigation flaws; no forensic evidence directly tied Jackson to the murder.
- During final closing, the lead prosecutor walked toward Jackson, gestured, and loudly said, “Just tell us where you were! That’s all we are asking, Noura!” Defense immediately objected and moved for a mistrial; court denied mistrial and later gave curative instructions.
- The State failed to disclose, until after trial, a material third police statement by prosecution witness Andrew Hammack that contradicted his trial testimony and revealed he had used ecstasy and may have left his phone elsewhere that night; defense had repeatedly requested Brady materials about Hammack pretrial.
- On appeal the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed but split on the Griffin claim; Tennessee Supreme Court granted review and addressed (1) improper comment on defendant’s silence and (2) Brady violation for untimely disclosure of Hammack’s third statement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Jackson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecutor’s closing remark improperly commented on defendant’s Fifth Amendment right not to testify | Remark was a permissible summation of testimony and not a comment on silence; harmless error if any | Comment (with gestures and address to Jackson) plainly invited jury to draw adverse inference from silence and violated Griffin; not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Court held remark was a constitutional Griffin violation (jury would necessarily see it as comment on silence) and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt — reversal required |
| Standard of review for prosecutorial-comment-on-silence claims | N/A | Claim should be reviewed de novo and by the two-part test (intent or character of remark) | Court adopts de novo review and a two-part test: (1) manifest intent to comment on silence; or (2) remark such that jury would necessarily take it as comment on silence |
| Whether suppression of Hammack’s third statement violated Brady and was material | Late disclosure was inadvertent and not outcome-determinative | Suppressed statement was impeachment evidence and material because it contradicted Hammack’s trial testimony and could have supported alternate-suspect/alibi investigation; undermined confidence in verdict | Court held Brady violation occurred; statement was material and not harmless — independently requires new trial |
| Miscellaneous evidentiary rulings: attorney-client privilege for Genevieve Dix and admission of drug/character evidence | State: Dix told Jackson she was not acting as counsel; drug/alcohol evidence admissible for motive | Jackson: communications with Dix were privileged; testimony about drug/alcohol use was prejudicial propensity evidence | Court affirmed trial-court finding that no attorney-client relationship existed with Dix (trial court credited Dix). Court cautioned stricter Rule 404(b) scrutiny on drugs/sexual-conduct evidence at retrial but did not order reversal on those grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prosecutorial comment on defendant’s silence forbidden)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose favorable, material evidence)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (constitutional error reversible unless State proves harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (use of post-arrest silence after Miranda warnings violates due process)
- United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25 (1988) (prosecutor may fairly reply to defense argument that government denied defendant opportunity to tell his side)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality in Brady claims assessed by reasonable probability of different result and considered collectively)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (Brady extends to impeachment evidence)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (impeachment evidence relating to witness deals must be disclosed)
- Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (prosecutor’s special duty to seek justice, not merely convict)
- Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999) (Griffin rule’s principle applied consistently; no adverse-inference exception at sentencing)