State of Tennessee v. Nathan Bernard Lalone, E2016-00439-CCA-R3-CD

Background

On Nov. 16, 2011 Christian Sosa was shot and killed and Meghan Bennett was wounded at tennis courts in Apison, TN; Nathan Lalone was indicted for first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder.
Lalone gave a recorded custodial statement Nov. 17, 2011; after receiving Miranda warnings he denied involvement, then said “I ain’t got nothing else to say,” a detective left, and ~9 minutes later Detective Gienapp resumed interrogation without new Miranda warnings and obtained inculpatory statements.
At trial the State played Lalone’s recorded statement and also played full video-recorded statements of alleged accomplices Blake Adams and Sabrina (Sabrina) Lovett; Adams and Lovett implicated Lalone but their memories and consistency varied.
No forensic evidence tied Lalone to the shooting; corroborative proof was circumstantial (Walmart footage showing clothing/colors, timing driving tests between Walmart and the courts, Lalone wearing black in footage, Lalone’s license found in woods).
Trial court denied motions to suppress and for interlocutory appeal; Lalone convicted; post-conviction proceedings led to delayed/new-trial process and this appeal.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Lalone's Argument	Held
Whether Lalone unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent	His words were equivocal and meant he’d told all he knew, not a clear invocation	His statement (“I ain’t got nothing else to say…”) was an unambiguous invocation and interrogation must have ceased	Court held the statement was an unambiguous invocation and police must have ceased questioning
Whether police scrupulously honored the invocation before resuming interrogation	Short break and different officer justified resuming without new warnings; not a Mosley violation	Resumption after ~9 minutes by another detective without fresh warnings violated Miranda/Mosley and tainted subsequent statements	Court held police did not scrupulously honor the invocation; resumption without warnings violated Miranda and tainted later statements
Whether admission of Lalone’s post-invocation statements was harmless error	Statements were corroborative and case not dependent on them; harmless beyond a reasonable doubt	Statements were central and highly probative; erroneous admission probably affected verdict	Court held error was not harmless; convictions reversed and remanded for new trial
Whether playing full video of Lovett’s interview was proper impeachment or substantive evidence	Prosecutor used video to impeach credibility; court allowed full video	Full unredacted video admitted without confronting witness on specific inconsistencies and without required Rule 803(26) hearing; prejudicial	Court found plain error: trial court violated Rule 613(b)/803(26) procedures, failed to give limiting instruction; admission prejudicial and supports new trial

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation requires warnings and statements after invocation of rights are inadmissible)
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (post-invocation questioning admissibility depends on whether the right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored)
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (invocation of Miranda right to remain silent must be unambiguous)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (requests for counsel must be clear; objective test for clarity applies)
State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265 (Tenn. 1992) (Tennessee voluntariness test and consequences when Miranda invocation is not honored)
State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537 (Tenn. 2013) (non-structural constitutional errors and harmless-error standard)
State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274 (Tenn. 2000) (procedures for admitting prior inconsistent statements impeachment vs. substantive use)
State v. Reece, 637 S.W.2d 858 (Tenn. 1982) (failure to give limiting instruction for prior inconsistent statements can be fundamental error when prejudicial)