State of Tennessee v. Mark Harold Lullen aka Luellen, W2016-00709-CCA-R9-CD

Background

During a traffic stop on April 20, 2015, Officer Austin shot Mark Lullen; Lullen was hospitalized after crashing his vehicle. TBI agents interviewed Lullen in his hospital room the next morning.
Two TBI agents entered while Lullen was asleep; he awoke, began talking, and the agents identified themselves, showed credentials, told him he was not under arrest and that he did not have to speak. No Miranda warnings were given. The interview lasted ~30 minutes; Lullen signed a written statement.
Lullen was later indicted for attempted second-degree murder, aggravated assault, and DUI-related offenses from the incident. He moved to suppress his statement arguing Miranda warnings were required and that the statement was involuntary (he was on prescription medication).
At the suppression hearing, TBI Agent Faulkner testified Lullen was alert and voluntarily answered; Lullen’s brother testified Lullen was medicated, disoriented, and that agents should have left until counsel was present. The trial court found the brother not credible but concluded Lullen was under prescription drugs and suppressed the statement for failure to give Miranda warnings.
The State obtained interlocutory review. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the suppression as to Miranda, holding Lullen was not in custody during the interview, and remanded for findings on voluntariness because the trial court made no factual findings on that separate issue.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Lullen's Argument	Held
Whether Miranda warnings were required for the hospital interview	Agents argued interview was noncustodial: agents told Lullen he was not under arrest, did not restrain him, no police prevented leaving	Lullen argued he was hospitalized/incapacitated and thus not free to leave; agents should have Mirandized him	Miranda warnings not required — interviewing in hospital was noncustodial under the totality of circumstances (reasonable person would not feel deprived of freedom to degree associated with arrest)
Whether the trial court properly suppressed statement based on agent subjectivity about charges	State argued subjective view that charges would follow is irrelevant to custody analysis	Lullen argued agents should have known charges likely and thus should have Mirandized	Trial court erred to base suppression on notion agents should have known charges; custody determination is objective and not controlled by officer's subjective beliefs
Whether the statement was voluntary given alleged medication/intoxication	State argued evidence preponderates that statement was voluntary: agent testimony, medical records showing alertness	Lullen argued prescription drugs and post-surgery condition rendered statement unintelligent/involuntary	Remanded — court did not make required factual findings on voluntariness; trial court must hold further proceedings and find facts on whether will was overborne
Proper standard of review for suppression rulings	State urged that factual findings should be upheld and legal application reviewed de novo	Lullen relied on trial court’s factual findings about medication and impairment	Court applied standard: appellate courts defer to trial factual findings but review legal application de novo; here appellate court upheld credibility finding but reversed legal custody ruling

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (establishing warnings required for custodial interrogation)
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (distinguishing voluntariness inquiry from Miranda)
State v. Anderson, 937 S.W.2d 851 (Tenn. 1996) (objective "custody" test and relevant factors)
State v. Dailey, 273 S.W.3d 94 (Tenn. 2009) (Miranda applies only when in custody and subjected to interrogation)
State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (voluntariness requires review of accused's characteristics and interrogation details)
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (confession involuntariness analysis: threats, promises, improper influence)