State of Tennessee v. LaJuan Harbison
539 S.W.3d 149
| Tenn. | 2018Background
- On Sept. 7, 2012, a shooting near Austin‑East High School involved two vehicles. Harbison was driving one vehicle; Brown and Campbell were in the other. Multiple people fired; several victims were shot.
- Harbison was indicted with co‑defendants on counts including attempted first‑degree murder (later reduced/converted in part) and four counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He was convicted by a jury of four attempted voluntary manslaughters and four firearm counts; effective sentence 22 years.
- Posttrial, the trial court reduced/ dismissed some robbery counts as to Brown and Campbell. Harbison moved for severance and raised a challenge to multiple firearm convictions (arguing only one gun was used). The trial court denied relief.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding the trial court erred in denying severance, that multiple firearm convictions violated double jeopardy, and that evidence was insufficient as to one attempted voluntary manslaughter count; it remanded for a new trial.
- The State appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court on severance, preservation of the double jeopardy issue, and whether multiple firearm convictions (one gun, multiple victims) violate double jeopardy.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court reinstated three attempted voluntary manslaughter convictions and three firearm‑employment convictions, holding (1) denial of severance was not an abuse of discretion, (2) Harbison preserved his double jeopardy/unit‑of‑prosecution claim, and (3) multiple convictions were permissible because the statute’s unit of prosecution is each act of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony (i.e., per underlying felony/victim).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court abused discretion by denying severance | State: joint trial proper; promotes efficiency, evidence closely connected | Harbison: prejudiced by antagonistic defenses, lurid/irrelevant evidence, inability to present individualized defense | Denial not an abuse of discretion; no clear prejudice; offenses arose from same time/place and jury was properly instructed |
| Whether Harbison waived double jeopardy/unit‑of‑prosecution challenge | State: issue waived for failure to raise properly in motion for new trial/appellate brief | Harbison: preserved claim in amended motion for new trial and on appeal challenging multiple firearm convictions based on single weapon | Harbison preserved the issue; amended motion and argument put trial court and State on notice |
| Whether multiple convictions for employing a firearm violate double jeopardy when one gun was used against multiple victims | State: unit of prosecution is each act of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony; multiple convictions allowed for multiple victims | Harbison: unit of prosecution should be number of firearms used; one gun = one firearm count only | Statute’s language and legislative intent establish unit of prosecution is each employment/attempt during each dangerous felony; multiple convictions allowed |
| Remedy following holdings | N/A | N/A | Reversed Court of Criminal Appeals; reinstated three attempted voluntary manslaughter and three firearm convictions; remanded for resentencing and corrected judgments |
Key Cases Cited
- Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993) (standards for severance and limiting instructions in joint trials)
- United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (severance appropriate in highly complex, multi‑defendant RICO prosecutions)
- United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (severance required where disparity of charges and complexity prejudiced defendant)
- State v. Smith, 436 S.W.3d 751 (Tenn. 2014) (double jeopardy review and distinctions between multiple‑description and unit‑of‑prosecution claims)
- State v. Watkins, 362 S.W.3d 530 (Tenn. 2012) (double jeopardy principles and legislative intent in unit‑of‑prosecution analysis)
- State v. Dotson, 254 S.W.3d 378 (Tenn. 2008) (abuse‑of‑discretion standard for severance)
