State of Tennessee v. Kaylon Sebron Bailey
E2015-01127-CCA-R3-CD
| Tenn. Crim. App. | Sep 5, 2017Background
- Defendant Kaylon Sebron Bailey was tried twice for first-degree premeditated murder and possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony; first trial ended in mistrial for juror misconduct; second trial resulted in convictions and concurrent sentences (life and two years).
- Victim Kima Evans was shot multiple times on January 13, 2012, survived 16 days in a coma, then died from complications; multiple rifle casings were recovered and ballistics showed same firearm fired all casings.
- At the scene the victim identified his shooter by name to his mother (on a 9‑1‑1 call) and reportedly to paramedic Ronald Smith (heard as "Caleb Bailey" by Smith); neighbors heard similar identifications.
- Defense presented alibi witnesses placing Bailey elsewhere that evening and pointed to potential issues with the identification and surrounding circumstances (e.g., victim’s concern about drugs/cell phones, possible mishearing).
- Trial court admitted the victim’s out‑of‑court identifications as dying declarations and, alternatively, as excited utterances; Bailey did not obtain suppression at trial and raised these evidentiary rulings and sufficiency on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Bailey) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of victim’s identification to his mother (9‑1‑1) | Statement was admissible as a dying declaration or, alternatively, a nontestimonial excited utterance; thus admissible and did not violate Confrontation Clause | Victim wasn’t under belief of imminent death; statement was hearsay/testimonial and inadmissible under dying declaration and Crawford | Affirmed: admissible as dying declaration; also nontestimonial and admissible as excited utterance if needed |
| Admissibility of victim’s identification to paramedic (Smith) | Same: admissible under dying declaration | Victim’s statements not made under belief of impending death; casual conversation in ambulance undermines dying‑declaration element | Affirmed: admissible as dying declaration |
| Confrontation Clause (testimonial hearsay) | Even if testimonial, dying declaration exception allows admission; otherwise statement was nontestimonial because primary purpose was to obtain aid and identify perpetrator during ongoing emergency | Claimed statements were testimonial requiring prior cross‑examination (Crawford) | Affirmed: statements were nontestimonial (primary purpose was aid/ongoing emergency) and, in any event, admissible as dying declarations |
| Sufficiency of the evidence (identity) | Victim identifications, corroborating physical evidence (casings, matching palm print, cell‑tower records, backpack/wig), and circumstances supported conviction beyond a reasonable doubt | Alibi witnesses (family) placed Bailey elsewhere; identification testimony was unreliable/misheard | Affirmed: viewing evidence in strongest light for State, a rational jury could find identity beyond reasonable doubt |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (testimonial hearsay requires prior opportunity for cross‑examination under the Confrontation Clause)
- State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136 (Tenn. 2007) (elements and rationale for dying‑declaration hearsay exception)
- State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739 (Tenn. 2009) (appellate standard for trial court factual findings on hearsay admissibility)
- Kendrick v. State, 454 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2015) (multi‑layered standard of review for hearsay rulings)
- State v. McCoy, 459 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2014) (dying declarations may be admissible even if testimonial)
- State v. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d 799 (Tenn. 2010) (nontestimonial statements: primary‑purpose test; identity responses during an ongoing emergency are nontestimonial)
- State v. Schiefelbein, 230 S.W.3d 88 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007) (questions of law vs. fact in hearsay admissibility review)