State of Tennessee v. Joseph Cox, E2020-00018-CCA-R3-CD

Background

On May 1, 2017, Joseph Cox (the Defendant) spanked his girlfriend’s nearly six‑year‑old son with a belt; the child had significant bruising discovered May 3. Cox later admitted spanking the child.
The child’s mother testified she did not authorize Cox to discipline the child; Cox sometimes provided childcare while they lived in his mother’s home.
The grand jury returned a presentment for child abuse (unreasonable corporal punishment); at trial the jury acquitted Cox of child abuse but convicted him of the lesser‑included offense of misdemeanor assault.
Cox was sentenced to 11 months, 29 days with split confinement: 60 days in jail and the remainder on probation; he appealed.
Issues on appeal: (1) motion to dismiss the presentment for procedural noncompliance and constitutional challenges to the child abuse statute (vagueness, parental‑rights, free exercise), (2) denial of certain requested jury instructions about reasonable corporal punishment and burden of proof, and (3) split‑confinement sentence challenged as an abuse of discretion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Procedural adequacy of presentment under T.C.A. §39‑15‑401(d)(1)	Grand jury presentment/indictment cures any defect in an affidavit or omission of the investigative report or medical verification; the statutory paperwork requirement applies to warrants/summons only.	Presentment must include the law‑enforcement report or independent medical verification before charges may be instituted; omission requires dismissal.	Affirmed: grand jury presentment cures any prior defect; the report/medical‑verification requirement governs issuance of warrants/summons, not grand‑jury prosecutions.
Statute vagueness (and as‑applied challenge re: in loco parentis)	The child‑abuse/assault statutes give fair notice; reasonableness standards are constitutionally permissible and jury decides reasonableness.	Statute is vague because it uses a reasonableness standard without clearer definition; rights to chastisement/in loco parentis make application unconstitutional.	Not vague as applied. Issue as to child‑abuse statute is moot because defendant was acquitted of child abuse; assault (as lesser included) is constitutional and jury could find either lack of in loco parentis or unreasonable corporal punishment.
Right to parent / Free exercise	State: parental or in loco parentis discipline is permitted but limited by reasonableness; prosecution for unreasonable corporal punishment does not violate parental or religious rights when child is harmed.	Prosecution infringes on fundamental right to rear/discipline children and on free exercise of religion endorsing corporal punishment.	Rejected: prosecution did not violate rights; defendant offered no evidence of sincere religious practice and limitations on corporal punishment (to prevent significant harm) are constitutionally permissible.
Jury instructions	Court’s instructions (including that reasonable corporal punishment is lawful and excessive punishment is unlawful) were adequate; burden of proof instruction applied to State.	Requested additional factors defining reasonable/unreasonable punishment and explicit statement that State bears burden to prove punishment was unreasonable.	Denied: trial court adequately instructed the jury and additional instructions were not required.
Sentencing / split confinement	State: trial court considered victim vulnerability and statutory factors and acted within discretion.	Cox: court failed to articulate reasons and should have imposed full probation.	Affirmed: court did not abuse discretion; made findings, considered sentencing principles, and permissibly imposed split confinement.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Toliver, 117 S.W.3d 216 (Tenn. 2003) (discusses parental/in loco parentis discipline limits and jury role)
State v. Harton, 108 S.W.3d 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (reasonableness standard in criminal statutes is not unconstitutionally vague)
State v. Pickett, 211 S.W.3d 696 (Tenn. 2007) (vagueness and statutory interpretation principles)
State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008) (adequacy of jury instructions)
State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012) (abuse‑of‑discretion standard with presumption of reasonableness for sentencing)
State v. Troutman, 979 S.W.2d 271 (Tenn. 1998) (no presumption of probation for misdemeanants)
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (U.S. 1923) (parental liberty interest protected by Due Process)
Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993) (parental rights as fundamental privacy interest)