State of Tennessee v. Joseph Durward Watson, II, E2016-00105-CCA-R3-CD

Background

Officers from the Fifth Judicial District Drug Task Force went to defendant Joseph Durward Watson II’s residence on December 20, 2013 to serve a civil levy for unpaid court fines/costs related to a 2003 conviction. Deputies had prior complaints and informant-led suspicion of drug sales at the residence.
Watson answered the door, told deputies the house belonged to his girlfriend, said his keys were inside and that he could not reenter, emptied loose change, and was told he was free to leave; he left on foot.
Deputies remained on the property after Watson left, walked around the curtilage, smelled marijuana at the crawl-space vents, observed partially smoked marijuana on the porch, and later obtained a search warrant. Several pounds of marijuana were found inside.
Watson moved to suppress the evidence; the trial court granted suppression, holding deputies exceeded the scope of the levy and used it as a pretext to investigate; the court also initially questioned whether the fines had converted to a civil judgment but later found the levy valid while reaffirming the scope/suppression ruling.
The State appealed, arguing Watson disclaimed any expectation of privacy (relying on State v. Ross) and therefore lacked standing; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court, finding Watson did not disclaim his privacy interest and that deputies exceeded the levy’s scope.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing to challenge the search (disclaimer/abandonment)	State: Watson told deputies the home belonged to his girlfriend and left the property, so he disclaimed/abandoned any expectation of privacy (per Ross) and lacks standing.	Watson: He did not relinquish control; his keys were locked inside, he kept possessions there, and he did not surrender the right to exclude others.	Court: Watson had standing — his statements did not amount to an affirmative relinquishment of the right to exclude or a disclaimer like in Ross.
Validity/conversion of criminal fines to civil judgment	State: Levy was properly issued under clerk’s procedures and fines can be collected post-sentence.	Watson: Trial court initially questioned automatic conversion; argued levy may have been invalid.	Court: Ultimately found authorities treat criminal fines/costs as collectible by levy and that a valid levy existed, but this did not affect suppression result.
Scope and use of levy (pretext and curtilage entry)	State: Deputies were executing a valid levy and allowed to approach property/knock.	Watson: Deputies exceeded scope by remaining on property after he left and by entering/walking curtilage to search for property and to detect drug odor; levy used as pretext.	Court: Deputies exceeded the lawful scope of levy execution by entering curtilage and using it as a pretext to investigate; this supported suppression.
Admissibility of sensory-based observations (smell of marijuana)	State: Smell provided probable cause for warrant if lawfully obtained via lawful approach.	Watson: Smell resulted from officers’ unlawful incursion beyond levy scope, so it cannot justify the warrant.	Court: Because officers exceeded levy scope, subsequent observations (odor leading to warrant) were fruit of the unlawful intrusion and suppression was proper.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833 (Tenn. 2001) (disclaimer of ownership can negate a Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy)
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (Fourth Amendment rights are personal and depend on legitimate expectation of privacy)
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Fourth Amendment protects people’s reasonable expectations of privacy)
State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. 1997) (warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable; standards for reviewing suppression rulings)
State v. Turnbill, 640 S.W.2d 40 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (factors relevant to whether an individual has a subjective expectation of privacy)