State of Tennessee v. Joseph Durward Watson, II - Dissenting Opinion
E2016-00105-CCA-R3-CD
| Tenn. Crim. App. | Apr 10, 2017Background
- Police executed a levy at a Blount County residence and knocked on the front door, observed vehicles in plain view, and engaged the defendant in a consensual encounter in the front yard.
- Defendant told officers he did not live at the house, that it belonged to his girlfriend, and that he had left his keys inside; he then left the property before officers searched.
- Officers searched the curtilage and later obtained a warrant to search the home, finding evidence that was suppressed by the trial court.
- The issue on appeal concerns whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy (standing) to challenge the warrantless portions of the search.
- Judge Easter’s dissent argues the defendant disclaimed and abandoned any privacy interest, so he lacked Fourth Amendment standing and the suppression should be reversed.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Watson's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the residence/curtilage and thus standing to challenge the warrantless search | The State would assert defendant retained a privacy interest (ownership/possession) sufficient to challenge the search | Watson argued he did not own or live in the house and disclaimed any interest; he left before the search | Dissent would hold defendant lacked standing because his voluntary disclaimer and conduct established abandonment of any privacy interest |
| Whether a disclaimer of ownership alone can defeat an expectation of privacy | State would contend disclaimer is one factor, not necessarily dispositive | Watson relied on his oral disavowal and departure as demonstrating abandonment | Dissent treats the disclaimer as sufficient to extinguish expectation of privacy under Ross |
| Relevance of officers’ knowledge or suspicion about true ownership | State may argue officers’ knowledge that defendant actually owned the house undermines any claim of abandonment | Watson stressed his statements and actions at the scene as manifesting abandonment regardless of officers’ beliefs | Dissent holds officers’ knowledge is irrelevant once defendant voluntarily disclaimed interest |
| Whether the scope of the levy was exceeded by searching backyard/curtilage (if standing exists) | State would defend officers’ movements as within levy scope or lawful investigative steps | Watson argued officers exceeded the levy scope and thus the search was unlawful | Dissent deemed this question unnecessary because, in his view, Watson lacked standing |
Key Cases Cited
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (standing requires legitimate expectation of privacy)
- Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (abandoned property not protected by Fourth Amendment)
- Salvucci v. United States, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (ownership or property interest does not alone resolve standing)
- State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833 (Tenn. 2001) (voluntary disclaimer of ownership can constitute abandonment and defeat expectation of privacy)
- State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723 (Tenn. 2010) (Ross creates an exception: disclaimer of interest may eliminate expectation of privacy)
- United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971 (1st Cir. 1994) (disclaimer of ownership amounts to declaration of indifference, negating privacy concern)
- United States v. Sanders, 130 F.3d 1316 (8th Cir. 1997) (a defendant’s claim of abandonment can be effective even if officers suspect the claim is false)