564 S.W.3d 423
Tenn.2018Background
- Jonathan Patterson pleaded guilty to 20 offenses (multiple thefts, burglaries) pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(B) (open plea); State and defense agreed offender classifications and applicable ranges but not specific sentence lengths.
- At sentencing the trial court imposed maximum Range III sentences dictated by Career/Persistent Offender classifications and ordered certain sentences consecutive, producing a 31-year aggregate sentence.
- Patterson filed a timely Rule 35 motion (within 120 days) seeking reduction of sentence; he offered no new post‑sentencing evidence at the Rule 35 hearing.
- The trial court granted the Rule 35 motion, reducing the aggregate sentence to 19 years by reordering concurrency/consecutivity; State appealed that grant.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that a defendant must present post‑sentencing information or developments to obtain relief under Rule 35; the Tennessee Supreme Court granted review.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court held that the Court of Criminal Appeals misapplied the McDonald post‑sentencing‑development standard: that standard applies only when a defendant pleaded guilty in exchange for a specific sentence (Rule 11(c)(1)(C)), not to open pleas under Rule 11(c)(1)(B). The trial court’s reduction was reinstated.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Patterson's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a defendant must present post‑sentencing information/developments to obtain Rule 35 relief after an open plea (Rule 11(c)(1)(B)). | Rule 35 relief should require post‑sentencing change to justify reduction (per Court of Criminal Appeals/McDonald). | No particular showing required; Rule 35 grants broad trial‑court discretion to reconsider sentences after open pleas. | For open pleas under 11(c)(1)(B), Rule 35 does not require post‑sentencing developments; trial court has broad discretion to reduce sentence. |
| Whether the McDonald/Semler post‑sentencing standard applies to all Rule 35 motions. | McDonald standard should apply generally to preserve plea bargains and limit Rule 35. | McDonald standard is limited to plea agreements that include a specific sentence. | McDonald standard is limited to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreements imposing specific sentences; it does not apply to open pleas. |
| Whether the trial court abused discretion by granting Patterson’s Rule 35 motion absent new evidence. | Granting without post‑sentencing evidence was an abuse of discretion. | Trial court acted within Rule 35 discretion after reflection and review of sentencing record. | No abuse; trial court properly exercised Rule 35 discretion and reduced the aggregate sentence. |
| Whether prior dicta (e.g., Ruiz) extending McDonald to all Rule 35 motions should control. | (Implicit) Prior cases support requiring post‑sentencing developments. | Ruiz’s dicta misstates scope; should be clarified/overruled as to Rule 35 for open pleas. | Clarified: Ruiz’s dicta is repudiated to the extent it extended McDonald to open pleas; primary holdings unaffected where distinct statutes apply. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hodges, 815 S.W.2d 151 (Tenn. 1991) (early Tennessee decision recognizing broad Rule 35 discretion and that a judge may reduce a sentence upon reflection or receipt of new information)
- State v. McDonald, 893 S.W.2d 945 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (applied a more limited standard—post‑sentencing developments—to reduce sentences imposed pursuant to plea bargains with specific agreed sentences)
- State v. Ruiz, 204 S.W.3d 772 (Tenn. 2006) (discussed Rule 35; this Court’s dicta had been read to extend McDonald standard broadly and is clarified/limited here)
- United States v. Semler, 883 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1989) (interpreting pre‑1987 federal Rule 35 to permit reduction of agreed sentences only in exceptional cases with post‑sentencing information)
- State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436 (Tenn. 2010) (recognizing that federal precedent can inform interpretation of Tennessee criminal procedure rules)