State of Tennessee v. James Robert Christensen, Jr.
2017 Tenn. LEXIS 195
Tenn.2017Background
- Tipton County narcotics investigators drove down Christensen’s unobstructed gravel driveway (60–70 yards) despite nearby "No Trespassing" signs, knocked at the front door, and smelled an active methamphetamine production inside.
- Christensen refused consent to enter; officers forced the locked front door, found an active meth "one-pot" lab (in freezer), multiple inactive labs, precursor chemicals, and firearms, and detained him.
- Christensen moved to suppress evidence on the ground the warrantless entry onto his curtilage was unlawful because of the posted signs; the trial court denied suppression and interlocutory appeal; he was convicted and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court granted discretionary review limited to whether the officers’ entry onto the curtilage (despite signs) was a Jardines-type trespass/search and, if so, whether it was supported by exigent circumstances/probable cause.
- The Court assumed, without deciding, the driveway was within the curtilage, applied Jardines and Katz analyses, and resolved whether the posted signs revoked the public’s implied license to approach the front door for a knock‑and‑talk.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Christensen) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers’ warrantless entry onto driveway/curtilage to conduct a knock‑and‑talk was a Jardines-type property intrusion/search | Approach to front door for consensual contact is permitted by implied license; signs alone rarely revoke it | Multiple clear “No Trespassing/Private Property” signs revoked the implied license and established a constitutionally protected exclusion of visitors | The posted signs near an unobstructed driveway did not, by themselves, revoke the implied license; the knock‑and‑talk was not a Fourth Amendment search |
| Whether Christensen had a reasonable expectation of privacy that would make the approach a Katz search | A reasonable person would not expect signs alone to bar ordinary visitors; society would not treat that expectation as reasonable | Signs evidenced subjective expectation of privacy and, under Katz, society should recognize that expectation as reasonable | Christensen failed Katz’s second prong; society would not view signs alone as barring ordinary approaches to knock |
| Whether a per se rule should treat No‑Trespassing signs as revoking implied license | Opposes per se rule; treats totality of circumstances and objective reasonable‑visitor test | Advocates recognition that signs (even without gates/fences) can revoke implied license for ordinary citizens | Court rejects per se rule for signs, endorses totality‑of‑circumstances objective test; signs may suffice in some circumstances but did not here |
| Whether court must reach exigent‑circumstances/probable‑cause issue | Not necessary if initial approach was lawful; Jardines/Katz analysis dispositive | If approach was unlawful, subsequent entry/exigent entry would be invalid | Because initial curtilage approach was lawful, Court did not address exigent‑circumstances or probable cause for the forced entry |
Key Cases Cited
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (approach onto curtilage with drug‑sniffing dog constituted a property‑based search)
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (physical intrusion onto property relevant to Fourth Amendment analysis)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (reasonable‑expectation‑of‑privacy two‑prong test)
- Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (distinction between open fields and curtilage; trespass law not synonymous with Fourth Amendment privacy)
- Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011) (knock‑and‑talk treated as a consensual encounter; occupant need not admit officers)
- United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988 (10th Cir. 2016) (post‑Jardines discussion that "No Trespassing" signs alone do not necessarily revoke implied license)
- State v. Christensen, 953 P.2d 583 (Idaho 1998) (recognizing signs and fences can revoke implied license; cited for rural/homeowner context)