State of Tennessee v. James D. Wooden, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 932

Background

James D. Wooden pleaded guilty in 1996 to aggravated burglary and theft (two concurrent, suspended sentences) and was later convicted by jury in 1997 of facilitation of aggravated robbery (Range I, sentenced to five years). The trial court revoked his probation and ordered sentences served concurrently, producing an effective five-year term.
In 2014 Wooden filed a pro se Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion alleging his five-year sentence exceeded the statutory presumptive minimum without the trial court stating enhancement factors on the record, and that one sentence should have run consecutively because it was committed while on probation.
The trial court denied the Rule 36.1 motion without appointing counsel or holding a hearing, stating it lacked jurisdiction over expired sentences. Wooden appealed; the State argued he failed to state a colorable claim under Rule 36.1.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding Wooden received a statutorily available sentence and any error was an appealable (not fatal/illegal) sentencing error; it also rejected the consecutive service claim because the statute permitted but did not require consecutive sentences.
The Tennessee Supreme Court granted review to decide (1) whether the Rule 28 definition of “colorable claim” applies to Rule 36.1 and (2) whether Rule 36.1’s definition of “illegal sentence” is coextensive with the habeas/mandate cases.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Wooden)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether the term “colorable claim” in Rule 36.1 should be defined as in Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28 §2(H)	Rule 36.1 should allow his allegations (that the trial court raised the sentence above the presumptive minimum without on-the-record enhancement findings) to qualify as a colorable claim.	Rule 36.1 requires a higher showing; Wooden did not state a colorable claim.	The Court held Rule 28 §2(H)’s definition applies: a colorable claim is one that, taken as true and viewed favorably to the movant, would entitle relief under Rule 36.1.
Whether the Rule 36.1 definition of “illegal sentence” differs from the habeas-corpus/historic definition (i.e., whether increased sentence without enhancement findings is an illegal sentence)	Wooden urged Rule 36.1 should treat his sentence-as-raised-without-findings claim as an illegal sentence.	The State argued such sentencing errors are appealable (not fatal) and do not render the sentence illegal under Rule 36.1.	The Court held Rule 36.1’s definition of “illegal sentence” mirrors the habeas corpus definition (sentences not authorized by statute or that directly contravene a statute); raising a sentence above the presumptive minimum without findings is an appealable error, not an illegal (void) sentence.
Whether Wooden’s motion under Rule 36.1 stated a colorable claim entitling him to counsel/hearing	Wooden contended his factual allegations and attached judgment documents were sufficient to state a colorable claim.	The State maintained the allegations failed because the five-year term was statutorily permissible and any error was correctable on direct appeal.	The Court held Wooden failed to state a colorable claim; his five-year sentence was statutorily authorized, so his claim alleges an appealable/sentencing error, not an illegal sentence.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn. 1978) (trial judge may correct an illegal sentence at any time)
Moody v. State, 160 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. 2005) (habeas corpus is the proper vehicle to challenge illegal sentences historically)
Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 751 (Tenn. 2010) (enumerating categories of illegal sentences)
Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445 (Tenn. 2011) (defining "illegal sentence" as one directly contravening statute or not authorized by statute)
Arnold v. State, 143 S.W.3d 784 (Tenn. 2004) (standards for reviewing whether post-conviction filings state a colorable claim)