State of Tennessee v. Jacob Pearman, M2015-02271-CCA-R3-CD

Background

Defendant Jacob Pearman was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of first‑degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, and child abuse for the February 14, 2013 killing of his wife; effective sentence: life + 5 years. Pearman confessed the day of the homicide.
Prior events: Pearman had been charged with abusing his stepson M.T.; M.T. ran away showing injuries and identified Pearman as the assailant; dependency proceedings and a court date were scheduled for February 14, 2013. The victim had told friends/family she planned to divorce Pearman and make him leave the home.
After an argument in the early morning hours of February 14, Pearman struck and manually strangled the victim; he admitted checking her and later attempted suicide, then turned himself in and made recorded admissions. Forensic and DNA evidence tied Pearman to the victim and scene.
Pretrial: Pearman moved for a change of venue and later renewed; extensive publicity existed but trial was held nearly two years after the homicide. Voir dire included individual questioning of jurors exposed to publicity; jurors were sequestered during trial.
Trial rulings/controversies included denial of change of venue, denial of a for‑cause strike against a juror who frequented Pearman’s gym, admission of many out‑of‑court statements by the victim under the state‑of‑mind hearsay exception, and prosecutor remarks in rebuttal. The trial court approved the verdict as the "thirteenth juror."

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Pearman)	Held
Change of venue	Publicity not shown to have biased the jurors who actually sat; trial court conducted careful voir dire and selection	Publicity was pervasive, inflammatory, and saturated venire; venue change or out‑of‑county jury required	Denial affirmed — court found publicity had decreased, voir dire adequate, no actual juror prejudice shown
Challenge to strike juror for cause (Juror Thompson)	Juror candidly exposed prior knowledge but unequivocally promised to set it aside and follow instructions	Juror’s gym connection and pretrial Googling created a close situational relationship and presumptive prejudice	Denial affirmed — trial court entitled to assess demeanor; no showing juror could not be impartial
Sufficiency of evidence on premeditation	Evidence (confession, method of killing, repeated choking, calm post‑offense conduct) permits inference of premeditation	Killing occurred in heat of passion provoked by marital dispute; no advance planning or procurement of weapon; confession shows suicidal, not homicidal intent	Conviction affirmed — rational juror could find intent formed before act; multiple factors supported premeditation
Admission of victim’s out‑of‑court statements (state‑of‑mind hearsay)	Many statements were admissible to show declarant’s state of mind and to rebut defense opening that marriage was loving/that she didn’t intend to leave	Statements were offered improperly to prove Pearman’s intent/premeditation (inadmissible third‑party conduct via Rule 803(3)); some testimony should have been excluded	Most challenged statements admissible or harmless if error; statements about fear improperly admitted but any error was harmless given strength of other proof
Prosecutorial misconduct in rebuttal closing	Prosecutor’s remarks challenging defense explanations for child’s injuries and certain speculative comments were responses to defense theory; no manifest intent to comment on defendant’s silence	Prosecutor improperly commented on defendant’s silence and argued facts outside the record (speculation about killing victim’s parents), inflaming jury	Mixed: comment about lack of alternative explanation was not impermissible comment on silence; speculative remark was improper but withdrawn and curatively instructed — errors found harmless
Trial court as thirteenth juror	N/A	Court failed to weigh evidence and should have granted new trial because verdict against weight	No error — trial court explicitly approved verdict as thirteenth juror and did not express disagreement

Key Cases Cited

State v. Hoover, 594 S.W.2d 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979) (factors and trial court discretion on change of venue and juror selection)
State v. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600 (Tenn. 2003) (standard for venue motions and voir dire importance)
State v. Pamplin, 138 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2003) (presumption of prejudice where juror’s situational relationship is too close)
State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554 (Tenn. 2014) (two‑part test for impermissible prosecutor comment on defendant’s silence; harmless‑beyond‑reasonable‑doubt standard)
State v. Leming, 3 S.W.3d 7 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (state‑of‑mind hearsay exception cannot be used to prove third‑party conduct; victim’s fear inadmissible to prove defendant’s premeditation)
State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817 (Tenn. 2002) (victim’s statements admissible to rebut defendant’s opening claims about marital harmony)
State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. 1993) (limits on using declarant’s fear statements and relevance to rebut defendant’s assertions)
State v. Kiser, 284 S.W.3d 227 (Tenn. 2009) (factors supporting inference of premeditation)
State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1997) (premeditation may be inferred from surrounding circumstances)