State of Tennessee v. Dominic Eric Frausto, 463 S.W.3d 469

Background

Defendant Dominic Frausto was tried for child rape and aggravated sexual battery based on allegations by M.B., who testified at trial; jury convicted him of two counts of aggravated sexual battery (later merged) and sentenced to 12 years.
At trial the defendant gave a written, signed extrajudicial statement admitting brief sexual contact; he also testified at trial and largely adopted that statement but disavowed the rubbing detail on cross-examination.
Physical evidence: carpet sample near the couch tested positive for spermatozoa matching the defendant’s DNA; a pediatric examiner recorded the child’s history of touching and found no physical injury but diagnosed condyloma.
During jury selection the trial court empaneled two panels of 18, permitted peremptory strikes across panels, then randomly excused 10 of the remaining 23 to reach 13 jurors — a procedure that deviated from Tenn. R. Crim. P. 24(d). Defense objected and preserved the issue.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction; the Tennessee Supreme Court granted review to address corpus delicti/corroboration of the confession and whether Rule 24 deviations require automatic reversal or harmless-error review.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Frausto)	Held
Sufficiency / Corpus delicti (corroboration of extrajudicial statement)	State: Defendant’s in-court testimony adopting his statement plus independent evidence (victim testimony, nurse examiner, DNA on carpet, mother’s testimony) sufficiently corroborates the confession.	Frausto: Conviction rests solely on his uncorroborated extrajudicial confession and thus is insufficient under corpus delicti rule.	Held: Because defendant testified under oath and adopted the statement (and other testimony/DNA corroborated key details), corpus delicti concerns are satisfied and the evidence is sufficient to support conviction.
Rule 24(d) jury-selection deviation — remedy standard	State: Concedes Rule 24 noncompliance but argues no prejudice and error is subject to harmless-error review.	Frausto: Trial court’s deviation impaired ability to exercise peremptory strikes and requires reversal without a showing of prejudice.	Held: Deviations are non-constitutional errors subject to harmless-error analysis under Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b); here the deviation was substantial and prejudiced the judicial process, so reversal and new trial are required.
Whether defendant’s sentencing review standard or jury instruction plain-error issues should be decided now	State: Defends appellate handling; argues waiver as to some issues.	Frausto: Raised additional sentencing standard and plain-error jury instruction claims.	Held: Because case is remanded for a new trial, the Court pretermits these additional claims and instructs future compliance with Clark for jury instructions.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22 (Tenn. 2014) (modified trustworthiness/corroboration standard for extrajudicial confessions)
State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268 (Tenn. 2014) (jury instruction guidance on sexual-offense charges)
Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148 (2009) (state deviations from jury-selection rules do not automatically require reversal absent constitutional error)
State v. Coleman, 865 S.W.2d 455 (Tenn. 1993) (defendant must show prejudice from jury-selection deviations; prejudice will not be presumed)
State v. Lynn, 924 S.W.2d 892 (Tenn. 1996) (substantial, unjustified deviation in empaneling special venire prejudiced administration of justice and warranted reversal)
State v. Bondurant, 4 S.W.3d 662 (Tenn. 1999) (flagrant deviation from jury-selection statutes undermines randomness and appearance of justice)