State of Tennessee v. David Hooper Climer, Jr.
400 S.W.3d 537
| Tenn. | 2013Background
- Defendant David Hooper Climer, Jr. was charged with first-degree premeditated murder and abuse of a corpse for his mother Doris DeBerry's 2007 death and dismemberment.
- Police investigated a missing-person report; officers interviewed Defendant after obtaining a warrant to search the victim's home where blood evidence and dismemberment artifacts were found.
- Defendant was interrogated twice after being in custody; Miranda warnings were given; he initially refused to sign a rights waiver form.
- Defendant confessed in a lengthy first interrogation and then guided police to the burial site; a second interrogation occurred after arrest, with further detail provided.
- State court proceedings: suppression motion denied; Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding confession voluntary and harmless; Tennessee Supreme Court granted review on the suppression issue.
- Court’s ultimate disposition: Miranda violation found; but physical evidence admissible; convictions for murder and abuse of a corpse reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Defendant unequivocally invoked his right to counsel | Climer repeatedly referenced counsel and appointment of an attorney | Statements show equivocal references, not a clear invocation | No unequivocal invocation; Edwards recovery applicable but waiver analyzed separately |
| Waiver of Miranda rights and voluntariness | Waiver can be implied if rights understood and not invoked | State failed to prove Defendant understood right to appointed counsel; implicit waiver insufficient | No valid express waiver; implicit waiver not proven; statements suppressed |
| Harmless error and admissibility of physical fruits | Non-confidential physical evidence corroborates guilt; error harmless | Confession cornerstone; error not harmless | Error not harmless; convictions reversed; physical evidence admissible on remand |
| Standards governing invocation pre- and post-waiver and Davis/Berghuis impact | Davis standard governs invocation (pre- and post-waiver) | Berghuis extends Davis; applicable to pre-waiver invocations as well | Pre-waiver Davis standard applied; Turner abrogated by Berghuis; analysis follows Davis/Berghuis framework |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishes Miranda warnings requirement and waiver standards)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (rules that once counsel is requested interrogation must cease until counsel present)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (ambiguity in invoking counsel requires clarification, not automatic cessation)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (confirms Davis standard applies in pre- and post-waiver contexts; requires unambiguous invocation or waiver)
- Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (two-step analysis of waiver: voluntariness and comprehension of rights)
- Butler v. United States, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (implicit waiver permissible when understood rights and uncoerced statement)