539 S.W.3d 223
Tenn. Crim. App.2017Background
- On March 18, 2015 Chad E. Henry was arrested after a collision; officers observed impairment and learned he had a prior DUI conviction.
- Officers told Henry a blood draw was mandatory under Tennessee’s implied-consent mandatory-draw statute and transported him to a clinic; no Implied Consent Form was read or signed, and no warrant was obtained.
- Henry never expressly consented on the record, was not advised that refusal would suspend his license, and later moved to suppress the blood-test results as an unreasonable warrantless search.
- The trial court granted suppression based on the officers’ failure to advise Henry of the consequences of refusal under Tenn. Code Ann. §55-10-406(c).
- The State appealed interlocutorily, arguing (1) implied consent supplies an exception to the warrant requirement, (2) the good-faith exception applies, and (3) prior-DUI motorists have a reduced privacy expectation.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed suppression: no recognized exception justified the warrantless blood draw; implied consent is not per se Fourth Amendment consent; good-faith exception did not apply; reduced-privacy argument rejected.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Henry) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tennessee’s statutory "implied consent" qualifies as Fourth Amendment consent and thus authorizes a warrantless mandatory blood draw | Implied consent (driver privilege) operates as constitutional consent absent revocation, so no warrant needed | Statutory "implied consent" is only a condition with penalties for refusal, not voluntary Fourth Amendment consent; warrant or other exception required | Implied-consent statute alone does not satisfy Fourth Amendment consent; warrantless draw not justified on that basis |
| Whether Henry voluntarily consented to the blood draw (actual consent) | No need to show express consent because implied consent applied and Henry did not withdraw it | Officers failed to advise of right to refuse/consequences; Henry’s impairment and medication raise doubt about capacity to consent | Totality of circumstances show Henry did not voluntarily consent; seizure violated Fourth Amendment |
| Whether the good-faith exception (Reynolds/Davis) renders the evidence admissible despite constitutional error | Officers relied on binding precedent (Humphreys) and statute; their belief in mandatory draw was objectively reasonable | Reliance was not objectively reasonable here: McNeely was decided before this arrest and law on implied-consent exception was unsettled; officers violated statutory procedure | Good-faith exception does not apply: precedent and law were insufficiently settled and officers failed to follow statutory procedure |
| Whether motorists with prior DUI convictions have a reduced expectation of privacy allowing warrantless draws | Prior conviction reduces expectation of privacy like conditions on probation; justifies more intrusive testing | Constitutional protections cannot be stripped as a condition of driving privilege; no authority supports reduced privacy for prior-DUI drivers | Argument waived and rejected on the merits: prior DUI does not eliminate Fourth Amendment protections |
Key Cases Cited
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (U.S. 2016) (breath tests may be incident to arrest; blood tests are significantly more intrusive and generally require a warrant or exigent circumstances)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (U.S. 2013) (natural dissipation of alcohol is not a per se exigency; exigency must be determined case-by-case)
- State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2016) (adopted Davis good-faith exception; held evidence may be admissible if obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on binding precedent)
- State v. Humphreys, 70 S.W.3d 752 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) (earlier panel treating implied consent and exigency as justifications for warrantless testing; court here abrogates that aspect)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (U.S. 1966) (blood draw is a search implicating privacy and bodily integrity; reasonableness requires warrant or exception)
- Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (U.S. 2011) (good-faith exception for reliance on binding appellate precedent)
- Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (U.S. 2011) (warrant generally required; warrantless searches presumed unreasonable absent an exception)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1973) (voluntariness of consent is judged under the totality of circumstances)