State of Tennessee v. Benjamin N. Widrick, M2020-01048-CCA-R3-CD

Defendant Benjamin Widrick, a 23-year-old ministry intern, engaged in a sexual relationship with a 16-year-old member of the church where he interned; he returned twice after leaving for college to continue the relationship.
Charged with sexual battery by an authority figure (Class B); plea agreement reduced charges to three counts of statutory rape (Class E).
Plea provided an effective five-year Range I probation term; trial court reservation of judicial diversion and sex-registry placement.
Evidence at sentencing: ongoing conduct over months, abuse of trust as a ministry intern, post‑incident texting (including requests for nude photos) when police posed as the victim, and limited remorse in the defendant’s statements.
Trial court denied judicial diversion, citing lack of remorse, abuse of trust, extended misconduct, and the need for deterrence/public protection given the ministry role; court declined to require sexual-offender registration.
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, finding the record showed the court considered required factors and that substantial evidence supported denial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Widrick)	Held
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying judicial diversion	Trial court properly applied Parker/Electroplating factors; denial supported by facts and public‑safety/deterrence concerns	Denial was an abuse; court overemphasized deterrence and did not properly weigh factors	Affirmed—trial court considered factors; presumption of reasonableness applies; no abuse of discretion
Whether reliance on deterrence/public protection justified denial	Deterrence/public interest warranted denial given abuse of trust by a ministry intern and ongoing conduct	Circumstances not so egregious to justify prioritizing deterrence over other factors	Held deterrence and public interest outweighed other factors; denial proper
Whether the court improperly considered an irrelevant personal belief about churches needing to know convictions	Comments were related to deterrence/public protection and therefore relevant	Court relied on an irrelevant personal belief about church hiring needs	Held remarks were relevant to deterrence/public‑interest analysis, not an improper factor
Whether the court's Biblical references rendered the decision improper	Remarks responded to defense's religion‑focused arguments and distinguished religious forgiveness from criminal accountability	Biblical comments were improper and prejudicial	Held remarks were responsive to defense themes and not reversible error

State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316 (Tenn. 2014) (presumption of reasonableness when trial court considers Parker/Electroplating factors)
State v. Electroplating, 990 S.W.2d 211 (Tenn. Crim. App.) (court must consider listed diversion factors)
State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945 (Tenn. Crim. App.) (trial court should state specific reasons on record when denying diversion)
State v. Dycus, 456 S.W.3d 918 (Tenn. 2015) (trial court must identify applicable factors though not recite all verbatim)
State v. Neeley, 678 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. 1984) (truthfulness and remorse are permissible considerations in sentencing)