State of Tennessee v. Anthony M. Crawford
M2015-02426-CCA-R3-CD
| Tenn. Crim. App. | Aug 31, 2017Background
- Defendant Anthony M. Crawford was tried twice for injuries to his girlfriend’s two‑month‑old child; first trial ended in mistrial when defense expert mentioned a polygraph despite an in limine order; at retrial jury convicted Defendant of lesser included aggravated assault and child abuse; total effective sentence 10 years (6 + 4 consecutive).
- Medical experts (Dr. Lowen) testified the infant had multiple fractures (various stages of healing) and bruises consistent with abuse; defense experts offered alternative medical explanations but jury credited State.
- On October 19, 2012, after a polygraph at the police station, Defendant signed a written statement admitting several instances of roughly handling the infant; Defendant moved to suppress that statement as coerced; trial court denied suppression after hearing evidence and viewing recording.
- Defense sought to present a forensic psychiatrist at the suppression hearing to testify as to Defendant’s suggestibility; trial court excluded that testimony as unnecessary because it found no police coercion.
- On appeal Defendant raised multiple issues: double jeopardy from mistrial, trial court commenting on voluntariness, exclusion of expert at suppression hearing, voluntariness of Oct. 19 statement, sufficiency, improper cross‑examination of character witnesses (Rule 405), election of offenses/unanimity, cumulative error, and consecutive sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Crawford) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Double jeopardy from mistrial | State: Defendant consented (no contemporaneous objection) so retrial allowed | Defendant: Mistrial deprived him of double jeopardy protection | Held: No double jeopardy; defendant had opportunity to object and did not; consent inferred. |
| 2. Trial court comment re: voluntariness | State: Court correctly ruled voluntariness as preliminary legal matter; jury may assess reliability | Defendant: Court improperly commented on evidence and curtailed testimony, infringing right to present defense | Held: Court erred in cutting off testimony but overall instruction lawful and error harmless. |
| 3. Exclusion of expert at suppression hearing | State: Expert on suggestibility irrelevant absent evidence of coercion | Defendant: Expert testimony necessary to show susceptibility to coercion | Held: Trial court did not abuse discretion; no coercion shown so expert would not substantially assist. |
| 4. Suppression of Oct. 19 statement | State: Statement was voluntary (Miranda given; breaks; no threats) | Defendant: Statement was coerced (sleep‑deprivation, pain, meds, repeated accusations) | Held: Trial court’s voluntariness finding upheld; statement admissible. |
| 5. Sufficiency of evidence | State: Circumstantial proof sufficient (caretaker, admissions, fractures) | Defendant: Evidence insufficient to tie him to injuries | Held: Evidence sufficient to support convictions. |
| 6. Impeachment of character witnesses (Rule 405) | State: Proper impeachment of character testimony with specific instances; probative | Defendant: Trial court failed to follow Rule 405 procedures and prejudiced defense | Held: Procedural deviations harmless; inquiry was relevant and jury instructed on limited use. |
| 7. Election of offenses / jury unanimity | State: Election made by injury age (new vs. healing fractures) | Defendant: Election insufficient—risk of non‑unanimous verdict | Held: Election adequate (described by healing stages); no plain error. |
| 8. Consecutive sentencing (dangerous offender) | State: Consecutive sentences warranted to protect public given severity and number of fractures | Defendant: Court improperly applied dangerous‑offender factor | Held: Court properly exercised discretion under Wilkerson factors; consecutive sentences affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976) (mistrial retrial permitted where manifest necessity absent defendant’s consent)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for appellate review of sufficiency: any rational trier of fact)
- Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (confession involuntariness standard — whether police conduct overbore will)
- State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995) (requirements for consecutive sentencing under dangerous‑offender analysis)
- State v. Shelton, 851 S.W.2d 134 (Tenn. 1993) (election requirement to protect unanimity; any description that identifies the prosecuted offense is sufficient)