State of Tennessee v. Anna Chick
M2016-01907-CCA-R3-CD
| Tenn. Crim. App. | Jul 17, 2017Background
- Anna Chick was convicted after a bench trial of one count of failure to appear (Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-609) for not returning to court after a lunch recess on September 3, 2015; a second count was dismissed by acquittal.
- Record evidence: an agreed order resetting the hearing to Sept. 3; docket entries showing a capias/forfeiture; a transcript excerpt showing the case was marked; a bondsman’s surrender form and a signed surrender-to-sheriff form showing Chick was surrendered and later taken into custody.
- Witnesses (court clerk, defense attorney, probation officer, bondsman) testified that Chick was present at initial docket call, court recessed for lunch ~one hour, she was not present when court reconvened, and a capias/forfeiture was issued.
- At sentencing the trial court found Chick to be a career offender based on numerous prior convictions and imposed the statutorily-mandated six-year Range III sentence, ordered consecutive to a prior TennCare fraud sentence.
- Chick appealed, arguing (1) § 39-16-609 is unconstitutionally vague, (2) evidence was insufficient, (3) Confrontation Clause violations in admitting documents/transcript, (4) State failed to show offense occurred before the indictment, and (5) the six-year sentence is cruel and unusual. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Chick) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of § 39-16-609 (vagueness) | Statute provides fair notice and definitions (via related statutory definitions and common meaning) | Statute is vague for not defining "failure to appear," "appearance," or "lawful authority" | Statute is not unconstitutionally vague; terms understandable in context |
| Sufficiency of the evidence | Evidence (documents, witness testimony) supports conviction | Without challenged hearsay/confrontation evidence, evidence insufficient | Issue waived for lack of briefing; even if error occurred, such evidence may be considered; conviction stands |
| Confrontation Clause (admission of exhibits/transcript) | Documents are public/business records and nontestimonial; limited transcript portions admitted were non-hearsay | Exhibits 2–8 were testimonial and violated Confrontation Clause | Exhibits 2–7 are public records/nontestimonial; admitted transcript portions did not implicate Confrontation Clause; no violation |
| Sentencing / Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual) | Enhanced six-year sentence is authorized by statute for career offenders and reflects defendant’s criminal history | Six-year maximum is grossly disproportionate / cruel and unusual | Sentence constitutional: statutorily required for career offender; not grossly disproportionate; consecutive order supported by defendant’s extensive record |
Key Cases Cited
- Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (establishes vagueness doctrine and fair notice requirement)
- Crank v. State, 468 S.W.3d 15 (Tenn. 2015) (statutes need not be absolutely precise; interpret terms in context)
- Pickett v. State, 211 S.W.3d 696 (Tenn. 2007) (vagueness test: fair notice and guidance to enforcement)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial statements barred by Confrontation Clause absent unavailability and prior cross-examination)
- Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (public records/business records are generally nontestimonial)
- State v. Smith, 48 S.W.3d 159 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (upholding enhanced sentences for career offenders based on criminal history)
- Lyons v. State, 802 S.W.2d 590 (Tenn. 1990) (statutory terms construed by common meaning and context)
- Cannon v. State, 254 S.W.3d 287 (Tenn. 2008) (business/public records are nontestimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes)