907 F.3d 742
4th Cir.2018Background
- Congress, following DOE proposals and negotiations with South Carolina, enacted 50 U.S.C. § 2566(c) (originating in the FY2003 NDAA) requiring DOE to remove not less than one metric ton of defense plutonium from South Carolina within two years if DOE failed to meet MOX production objectives; a later deadline required removal of all transferred plutonium by 2022.
- DOE pursued the MOX fuel program at Savannah River Site (SRS) but shifted toward a downblending alternative, missed the statutory MOX production objective, and did not remove one metric ton by the January 1, 2016 statutory deadline.
- South Carolina sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the All Writs Act seeking an injunction compelling DOE to remove one metric ton and to pay statutory assistance; the district court dismissed the payments claim (without prejudice) and rejected the constitutional claim, but held § 2566(c) imposed a nondiscretionary duty to remove a metric ton.
- The district court granted summary judgment under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) for an ‘‘agency action unlawfully withheld,’’ concluding that the APA mandates that a court "shall compel" such action and thus precludes equitable denial of relief; it then entered an injunction requiring DOE to remove at least one metric ton within two years (by Jan 1, 2020), subject to NEPA and other laws, and retained jurisdiction.
- DOE appealed, arguing (1) courts retain equitable discretion (as in mandamus) to refuse or limit relief under § 706(1), and (2) the two-year removal deadline was arbitrary and impossible given NEPA and technical constraints.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (South Carolina) | Defendant's Argument (DOE) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a court must exercise equitable discretion before awarding relief under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) for agency action "unlawfully withheld" | § 706(1) uses mandatory "shall," so court must compel the unlawfully withheld action and cannot apply mandamus-style equitable denial | § 706(1) should be read with traditional mandamus and equitable principles; courts must weigh equities before granting injunctions | Court held § 706(1) is mandatory for "unlawfully withheld" agency action; equitable mandamus principles do not permit denial of relief once statutory duty is shown |
| Whether the district court could craft a timetable (two-year deadline) for DOE to comply with § 2566(c) | Two-year deadline mirrors statutory contingency in § 2566(c) and Congress’s adoption of DOE’s earlier proposal; court may set date-certain relief tailored to law and facts | Two-year deadline is unreasonable and impossible; DOE’s operational constraints and NEPA require more time (DOE proposed 2025) | Court held district court did not abuse discretion; it permissibly relied on statutory deadlines and Congress’s judgment and could set a firm deadline while leaving NEPA compliance to DOE |
| Whether § 2566(c) and statutory framework foreclose injunctive relief or limit remedies to statutory assistance payments | Statute contains mandatory removal deadlines and contemplates injunctive relief; assistance payments do not preclude other remedies | The presence of assistance payments and congressional amendments shows Congress intended different or exclusive remedy or flexibility | Court held § 2566(c) authorizes court-ordered removal and the payments provision does not preclude injunctive relief; statutory scheme supports enforcement |
| Whether DOE may avoid injunction on impossibility grounds absent present, detailed proof | The State argued DOE failed to show impossibility and did not supply timelines or NEPA analysis; DOE may raise impossibility later in enforcement/contempt proceedings | DOE asserted compliance is impossible within two years due to NEPA and technical limits (downblending timelines) | Court held DOE did not prove impossibility; district court properly required DOE to attempt compliance and may entertain impossibility defenses later in enforcement proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55 (2004) (§ 706(1) limited to discrete, legally required agency actions; APA "carried forward" that aspect of mandamus practice)
- Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004) (mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and requires equitable discretion)
- Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394 (1976) (mandamus availability contingent on lack of other adequate means)
- Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1999) (when Congress sets a deadline for agency action, courts must compel compliance; no discretion to refuse relief)
- Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Central Intelligence Agency, 811 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2015) (interpreting § 706(1) to require courts to compel unlawfully withheld agency action)