STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CHRISTOPHER A. TARVER (16-02-0251, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED), A-0852-18

Background

Defendant Christopher Tarver, a youth travel basketball coach, was tried by jury and convicted on multiple counts arising from sexual and related misconduct involving a then-teenaged player (Darren). After trial, Tarver pled guilty to additional counts involving another victim; sentencing produced a lengthy aggregate term. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded.
At issue were eight second-degree child-endangerment convictions based on acts occurring in 2010–2011 when Darren was 16–17; N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) had defined "child" as under 16 at that time and was amended in 2013 to under 18.
The court held the prosecution of those eight counts violated the ex post facto clauses because the statute as written in 2010–2011 did not reach 16–17‑year‑olds; those convictions were plain error and reversed. Because of the prejudicial effect of those improper counts and the related evidence, the court vacated Tarver’s remaining convictions and remanded for a new trial.
The opinion also identifies multiple evidentiary errors the trial court made that should not be repeated on remand: (1) admitting testimony from Darren’s ex‑girlfriend as "fresh complaint" when the complaint was untimely; (2) admitting a voluminous amount of uncharged "bad act" evidence (alcohol/drug provision, out‑of‑state sexual misconduct, acts with other minors) beyond what was necessary; (3) allowing prejudicial testimony under an "opening the door" rationale after defense cross‑examination about severed charges; and (4) permitting certain lay‑opinion and hearsay‑type testimony from family witnesses.
The court found defense counsel’s questioning of a severed‑count witness to be a trial strategy (not ineffective assistance), but held the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution to expand the elicited severed allegations. The court left intact the possibility that Tarver may move to withdraw his post‑trial guilty pleas because those pleas were entered after the now‑vacated jury convictions.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Tarver's Argument	Held
Whether applying the 2013 amendment (raising protected age to under 18) retroactively violated ex post facto prohibitions	The statute's incorporation of Title 9 and legislative intent meant the pre‑2013 statute already protected under‑18 victims; no ex post facto problem	The 2010–2011 statute defined "child" as under 16; prosecuting acts against a 16–17‑year‑old under the amended standard is retroactive and forbidden	Reversed: pre‑2013 law covered under‑16 only; applying 2013 amendment would be ex post facto. Eight child‑endangerment convictions vacated and remaining convictions set aside as prejudiced.
Admissibility of Darren’s disclosure to his girlfriend (fresh complaint)	Disclosure was to a natural confidante during an ongoing relationship and admissible to negate inference from silence	Complaint occurred long after the alleged incidents (untimely) and related to out‑of‑state conduct; not a proper fresh complaint	Reversed admission as an abuse of discretion: complaint was not made within a reasonable time; jury instruction otherwise adequate but evidence should not have been admitted.
Admission of numerous uncharged bad‑acts (alcohol/drugs, out‑of‑state sexual acts, other minors) under Rose / N.J.R.E. 404(b)	Evidence was intrinsic or necessary background to show grooming, plan, progression, and intent	Volume and inflammatory nature were unnecessary and impermissible propensity evidence; Cofield/403 balance failed	Abuse of discretion: large volume of uncharged bad acts was unnecessary, excessively prejudicial, and likely diverted jury; such evidence must be limited on remand.
Whether defense counsel’s cross‑examination "opened the door" to severed allegations and whether counsel was ineffective	Once defense elicited parts of severed complaints, prosecution could rebut to place evidence in context	Counsel’s questions were strategic but did not warrant allowing the prosecution to elicit full severed allegations; also trial strategy does not equal ineffective assistance	Counsel’s performance deemed strategic (no Strickland relief on direct appeal), but trial court erred in permitting expansive responsive testimony under opening‑the‑door without proper 403/Cofield scrutiny.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458 (N.J. 2005) (ex post facto and retroactive judicial enlargement principles)
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (U.S. 1981) (ex post facto clause protects fair notice and reliance on existing law)
Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (U.S. 2001) (limitations on relief for judicial enlargement of criminal statutes)
State v. R.K., 220 N.J. 444 (N.J. 2015) (fresh‑complaint evidentiary standard and limiting instruction requirement)
State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141 (N.J. 2011) (intrinsic evidence and permissible background evidence outside strict 404(b) limits)
State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (N.J. 1992) (four‑prong test for admitting other‑crimes evidence)
State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588 (N.J. 2011) (application of fresh‑complaint doctrine to delayed disclosure by child victims)
State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390 (N.J. 2019) (N.J.R.E. 403 exclusion where inflammatory evidence substantially outweighs probative value)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑part ineffective assistance of counsel test)
State v. McInerney, 428 N.J. Super. 432 (App. Div. 2012) (discussed in relation to statutory age interpretation; treated as dicta for certain age statements)