STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. RHUMEIR D. MONEY (14-03-0691, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), A-5289-17

Background

June 15, 2013: a dark-colored Jeep drove by and fired on three men in Camden; Brian Burnett was killed; Jeroboam Fisher and Carlos Perry were wounded. Eyewitness J.V. and surveillance video identified a dark Jeep.
Police located a Jeep matching the description registered to Rhumeir Money; Money reported it stolen the day it was recovered.
Money (defendant) was brought to the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office and gave two Miranda‑advised statements (June 20 and June 21, 2013); the first contained admissions that he shot in “payback” and that Perry “shot at me so I shot back,” but the exact words during a contested portion of the first interview were disputed.
Victim Fisher gave a hospital‑bed statement identifying the shooter as "Reck/Wreck" and signed a photo; at trial Fisher recanted and said he had been given the name. The State played Fisher’s recorded hospital statement; the defense used the recantation heavily.
Defendant was convicted of murder, two counts of attempted murder, weapons offenses and conspiracy; he appealed, challenging suppression (invocation and waiver issues), hearsay/identification rulings, a detective’s testimony about surveillance footage, and sentencing.
The Appellate Division affirmed convictions and the sentence but vacated the trial court’s order that "settled the record" about the disputed words in the June 20 interview and remanded for a supplemental suppression hearing to determine (1) the exact words spoken during the contested portion, (2) whether that constituted an invocation of the right to remain silent, and (3) whether either statement (or the second as fruit of the first) is admissible.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Whether June 20 statement must be suppressed because police failed to scrupulously honor an invocation of the right to remain silent	Defendant's remark was unintelligible/not an unequivocal invocation; defendant waived any challenge by not contesting the transcript earlier	Defendant said "I'm not saying nothing" (or similar) and thus invoked Miranda; detectives ignored it and continued interrogation	The court vacated the trial court's record‑settlement order and remanded for a hearing to determine the exact words and then decide if an invocation occurred and whether the statement (or parts of it) is admissible.
2) Whether the June 21 statement is inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree	The second statement was independently obtained/adequately attenuated; admissible	The second statement derives from an earlier unconstitutional interrogation and must be excluded	Not decided on the merits; remand requires the trial court to evaluate attenuation factors and decide admissibility in light of the remand findings about the first statement.
3) Admissibility of Fisher’s hospital‑bed recorded statement and his identification of "Reck"	The recorded statement was admissible under Gross factors and N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1); any problematic hearsay was not solicited by the State and the defense acquiesced	The hospital statements were hearsay and the identification was unduly suggestive	The court upheld admission; defense invited/use of the evidence and failure to object foreclosed reversal; jury was instructed and could assess recantation.
4) Whether Detective King's testimony narrating/comparing surveillance video invaded the jury's role or violated N.J.R.E. 701	King's testimony was lay opinion based on his perception of both the video and the recovered Jeep and would assist the jury	King's narration/opinion usurped the jury on an ultimate issue and was improper post‑hoc opinion	No plain error: King’s testimony was permissible lay‑opinion/fact testimony under N.J.R.E. 701 (detective viewed both footage and vehicle), and the jury retained the role of weighing identity.

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda warnings and right to remain silent)
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (factors and scrupulously honor doctrine for post‑invocation questioning)
State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252 (New Jersey’s strict duty to scrupulously honor invocation; fruit‑of‑the‑poisonous‑tree analysis)
State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360 (ambiguous invocations must be clarified or interrogation ceased)
State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45 (invocation need not be highly technical; ambiguous statements can suffice)
State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263 (if agent reasonably perceives invocation, questioning must cease or clarify)
State v. Johnson, 118 N.J. 639 (analysis of attenuation and whether subsequent confession is tainted)
State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525 (factors for waiver, attenuation, and totality of circumstances review)
State v. Gross, 121 N.J. 1 (admissibility framework for recorded out‑of‑court statements)
State v. Pressley, 232 N.J. 587 (confirmatory identifications are not inherently suggestive)
State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1 (permissibility of lay‑opinion testimony by detectives comparing surveillance evidence to physical evidence)
State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (factors for imposing consecutive sentences)