STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. T.R.G.(13-01-0003, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED)
A-5308-14T2
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | Nov 17, 2017Background
- Defendant (T.R.G.) was convicted by a jury of first-degree aggravated sexual assault and related second-degree offenses for sexual abuse of his step-granddaughters; the court merged counts and sentenced him to 16 years with 85% parole ineligibility under NERA.
- Victims (Ann, Barbara, Cathy) testified to repeated sexual contact and a "tickle game" by defendant between 2010 and 2012; medical exams showed dysuria in one child but no acute genital trauma.
- The victims' father (Ted) testified; defense sought to admit testimony from defendant's former attorney recounting Ted's earlier expression of disbelief in Ann's allegations—court limited that testimony as improper opinion/hearsay.
- During trial defendant testified, invoked the Fifth on cross about post-bail contacts, then left the courthouse; the judge struck his testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it.
- Defense challenged evidentiary exclusions, prosecutor's opening/closing statements (including a remark that the presumption of innocence was "gone"), the striking of testimony after assertion of the Fifth, and the sentence; the Appellate Division affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of former-attorney testimony about Ted's prior statement that he didn’t believe victim | The limited testimony admitted (that Ted made inconsistent statements) was sufficient; opinion about credibility was inadmissible. | Trial court wrongly precluded testimony that Ted expressed disbelief in the accusations, which would show bias/instigation. | Court upheld exclusion of opinion as hearsay/lay-opinion; allowed only impeachment that Ted made inconsistent statements. |
| Prosecutor's closing: "presumption of innocence is gone" | Prosecutor argued evidence had "torn down" the presumption; closing was a misstatement but fleeting and cured by jury instructions. | Statement diluted burden of proof and was prosecutorial misconduct requiring reversal. | No plain error: judge properly instructed jury on presumption/burden; remark not clearly capable of producing unjust result. |
| Prosecutor's opening: descriptive language and "represent the people" phrasing | State: opening comments described evidence to be presented and were permissible. | Language was prejudicial, aligning jury with State and inflaming emotions. | Remarks were not egregious; defense did not object; judge instructed jurors to weigh evidence impartially; no reversal. |
| Striking defendant’s testimony after he invoked Fifth and left courthouse | State: once defendant took the stand he waived privilege and could not refuse cross; leaving and invoking Fifth justified striking testimony. | Striking testimony after he asserted the right to silence and left deprived him of due process and right to present a defense. | No plain error: taking the stand waives privilege for cross; refusal to continue and leaving justified striking testimony; counsel performance deferred to PCR. |
| Sentence (16 years with NERA) | State: sentence within statutory range and properly balanced aggravating/mitigating factors. | Sentence excessive and court failed to consider real-time effect of NERA. | Affirmed: court identified and weighed factors; sentence not clearly unreasonable. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Pasha, 280 N.J. Super. 265 (App. Div.) (limits on prior inconsistent statements and improper opinion testimony)
- State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583 (jury decides witness credibility; one witness cannot opine on another's truthfulness)
- State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515 (comments by prosecutor not objected to are reviewed under plain error; jury instructions presumed followed)
- State v. Bogus, 223 N.J. Super. 409 (defendant who testifies waives Fifth Amendment privilege as to cross-examination)
- State v. Feaster, 184 N.J. 235 (court should strike direct testimony if witness relies on privilege to avoid cross-examination on central matters)
- State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210 (sentencing requires identification and balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors)
