STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CARLIA M. BRADYÂ (15-05-0240, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)Â (CONSOLIDATED)(RECORD IMPOUNDED)
A-0483-16T4/A-0484-16T4
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | Sep 11, 2017Background
- Carlia M. Brady, a sitting Superior Court judge, was indicted by a Somerset County grand jury on: (1) second-degree official misconduct for allegedly refraining from "enforcing an arrest warrant" for her boyfriend, Jason Prontnicki; and (2) two third-degree hindering counts for allegedly harboring/concealing Prontnicki and providing/ aiding him (money/transportation/clothing) to avoid apprehension.
- Police told Brady of an outstanding Old Bridge arrest warrant for Prontnicki; she contacted police, then later allowed Prontnicki into her home on June 10–11, where he stayed for extended periods and later left with a duffel of clothing; police arrested him shortly after.
- Grand jury heard recorded calls, defendant’s testimony, police testimony, and text messages; prosecutor instructed the grand jury on hindering statutes and proposed that a judge may have a duty to "enforce an arrest warrant" if such duty is "clearly inherent" in the office.
- The trial court (Law Division) dismissed the official-misconduct count but denied dismissal of the two hindering counts; both State and Brady appealed; the Appellate Division consolidated and affirmed.
- The court affirmed denial of the hindering counts (sufficient prima facie evidence to indict) but affirmed dismissal of the official-misconduct count because the question whether a judge has a legally "clearly inherent" nondiscretionary duty to "enforce an arrest warrant" is a question of law for the court, not the grand jury, and the prosecutor improperly left that legal question to jurors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a judge has a nondiscretionary duty "clearly inherent" in the office to enforce an arrest warrant such that refraining from it can constitute official misconduct (N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2b) | A judge has an inherent, non-discretionary duty to ensure an arrest warrant is enforced (i.e., to notify/see warrant executed); Brady knew this duty | No such legally defined, always-present duty exists; the grand jury cannot decide pure questions of law; Code ethical guidance is not a criminal statutory duty | Dismissed official-misconduct count: existence/scope of a "clearly inherent" judicial duty is a question of law for the court; prosecutor may not leave that legal question to the grand jury; on these facts no statutory nondiscretionary duty to "enforce an arrest warrant" was established for indictment |
| Whether permitting the fugitive into the home and allowing him to remain constituted "harboring or concealing" under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3a(1) | Brady allowed Prontnicki to enter, close garage/house doors, keep him inside for extended time despite knowledge of warrant — sufficient to infer harboring/concealment and purpose to hinder | Brady’s conduct was passive/non-affirmative and insufficient to show affirmative harboring or intent to hinder | Denied dismissal: viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there was some evidence supporting harboring/concealment and intent to hinder; grand jury could indict |
| Whether offering money/transportation/clothing to Prontnicki amounted to providing a "means of avoiding discovery or apprehension" under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3a(2) | The packed duffel (multiple changes of clothes) and offered cab fare could be inferred to facilitate avoidance/escape; attempt instructions were appropriate | Money or aid may be equivocal and not necessarily intended to facilitate escape; mere offer insufficient | Denied dismissal: sufficient prima facie evidence for grand jury to find Brady aided in providing means to avoid capture or attempted to do so; indictment proper |
| Whether grand jury instructions were legally improper by leaving the existence/scope of a judicial duty to jurors | Prosecutor accurately framed uncertainty and asked jurors to decide whether such a duty is "clearly inherent" | Defendant argued that the existence of the duty is a pure question of law for the court and cannot be submitted as a factual question to the grand jury | Held for Brady on official-misconduct count: prosecutor improperly left a legal question to grand jurors; grand jury cannot be asked to decide pure questions of law about official duties |
Key Cases Cited
- In re P.L. 2001, 186 N.J. 368 (2006) (separation-of-powers limits on court-created law enforcement roles)
- United States v. Stacey, 896 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1990) (closing/locking door to conceal fugitive supports harboring)
- United States v. Shapiro, 113 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1940) (defining "harbor" and "conceal")
- People v. La Carrubba, 389 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1979) (ethical canons alone do not automatically create criminal liability for judges)
- People v. Garson, 848 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 2006) (distinguishing ethical-rule breaches from criminal official-misconduct unless an independent criminal element—e.g., benefit tied to official duty—exists)
- State v. Grimes, 235 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div.) (legal uncertainty about duties should not be presented to jury)
- State v. Morrison, 188 N.J. 2 (2006) (standard for reviewing indictment dismissals)