STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ANTONIO JONESÂ (12-05-1001, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), A-0063-14T3

Background

Defendant Antonio Jones (African‑American) was arrested Feb 2012 for an armed robbery of a white (Orthodox Jewish) victim and tried Feb 2014; convicted of first‑degree robbery and obstructing administration of law and sentenced to an extended life term under the three‑strikes law.
Key trial evidence: victim described a "short stocky, black fellow"; other witnesses variously described a "colored" or "black" suspect; victim could not positively identify defendant at the scene; defendant was found shortly after wearing similar clothing, fled from officers, and possessed an Israeli shekel coin taken in the robbery; items (including a sock‑wrapped novelty gun) were recovered nearby.
Substantial post‑indictment delay (~2 years) occurred; trial court reviewed and allocated responsibility among factors: crowded court calendar, judge/counsel changes, discovery requests, Hurricane Sandy interruptions, and delay in DNA testing by the State lab.
On remand the trial court applied the Barker v. Wingo balancing test, found roughly 15–16 months of delay largely attributable to the State but not deliberate, and concluded defendant showed no specific prejudice from delay; denied dismissal.
Defense requested voir dire questions regarding racial bias (including comparative crime‑rate question); trial judge refused to pose race‑related questions, stating he would not "inject race" into voir dire but would monitor peremptory use and consider cross‑racial identification instructions if needed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Speedy‑trial dismissal for post‑indictment delay	State: delays were largely non‑deliberate, partly neutral or due to court congestion and DNA testing; defendant not specifically prejudiced	Jones: ~2‑year delay violated constitutional speedy‑trial right and warranted dismissal	Denied. Court found delay significant and partly attributable to State but not deliberate; Barker balance did not require dismissal.
Whether trial court should ask jurors about racial bias in voir dire when victim/defendant differ in race	State: did not oppose open‑ended voir dire used; did not press for comparative crime‑rate question	Jones: court should ask questions probing racial bias (directive/supporting authority); refusal was error requiring reversal	Court: refusal to ask any threshold race‑bias question was an abuse of discretion, but record showed no indication jurors were tainted; error not prejudicial here, so conviction affirmed.

Key Cases Cited

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (sets four‑factor balancing test for speedy‑trial claims)
Cahill v. State, 213 N.J. 253 (New Jersey guidance on delay >1 year triggering Barker analysis)
Rosales‑Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (trial courts must inquire about racial bias on request in violent‑crime cases with racial disparity)
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (constitutional error where racial issues are inextricably bound with trial conduct)
State v. Kelly, 302 N.J. Super. 145 (voir dire discretion; courts encourage inquiry into racial bias on request)
State v. Horcey, 266 N.J. Super. 415 (threshold voir dire question required when victim/accused differ in race for violent crimes)
State v. Misurella, 421 N.J. Super. 538 (appellate standard reviewing speedy‑trial determinations)
State v. Le Furge, 222 N.J. Super. 92 (prejudice from delay requires more than anxiety or waiting burden)
State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383 (no reversible error where failure to ask racial‑attitude questions did not show juror bias)