STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. SHANNON WHOOLEYÂ (W-2015-1201-475, S-2015-1201-476 AND W-2015-1337-524,MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), A-3395-15T2

Defendant Shannon Whooley faced two municipal disorderly persons charges for marijuana possession in two different municipalities and sought consolidation to apply for a conditional discharge under N.J.S.A. 2C:36A-1.
The motion to consolidate was unopposed by both municipal court judges, both municipal prosecutors, the Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office, and the Middlesex County Assignment Judge; the Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office (MCPO) alone objected.
MCPO argued consolidation was improper because the offenses did not arise "out of the same facts and circumstances" and because Rule 7:8-4 permits consolidation only "for trial," so it could not be used to obtain negotiated dispositions or diversion.
The Assignment Judge (Thornton) granted consolidation, but limited relief to permitting defendant to seek a conditional discharge; if a conditional discharge were denied, the consolidated matter could proceed to trial.
The Appellate Division reviewed the rule interpretation de novo and affirmed the Assignment Judge’s order.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether municipal complaints originating in different municipalities may be consolidated when the offenses did not arise from the same facts and circumstances	MCPO: Rule 7:8-4 limits consolidation to matters arising from the same facts and circumstances	Whooley: Rule 7:8-4 allows consolidation with the defendant’s consent even when facts differ	Held: Rule 7:8-4 permits consolidation of complaints that do not arise from the same facts when the defendant consents; because Whooley sought and consented to consolidation, the rule’s first-sentence limitation did not bar consolidation.
Whether the phrase "for trial only" in Rule 7:8-4 forbids consolidation when parties seek negotiated dispositions or diversion (e.g., conditional discharge)	MCPO: "For trial only" means consolidation is available solely for joint trials, not for plea agreements or diversion outcomes	Whooley: A literal reading producing that result is absurd; consolidation should permit negotiated dispositions and diversion requests, and the Assignment Judge limited relief to seeking conditional discharge	Held: The court rejected a literal "for trial only" reading as producing absurd results; consolidation may be used to seek negotiated dispositions/diversion (here, conditional discharge), and if diversion is denied the matter can proceed to trial.

Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 A.2d 366 (N.J. 1995) (appellate review of legal interpretation is de novo and not owed special deference)
Wash. Commons, LLC v. City of Jersey City, 416 A.2d 555 (App. Div. 2010) (de novo review of court rule interpretation)
DiProspero v. Penn, 183 A.2d 477 (N.J. 2005) (rules should be read in context and given ordinary meaning)
Turner v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 162 A.2d 75 (N.J. 1999) (reject literal interpretations that produce absurd results contrary to policy)
Watt v. Mayor & Council of Franklin, 21 A.2d 274 (N.J. 1956) (same principle regarding absurd literal interpretations)
Hubbard v. Reed, 168 A.2d 387 (N.J. 2001) (statutory terms should not be read literally when inconsistent with statute’s purpose)
Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 A.2d 218 (N.J. 1998) (contextual interpretation of statutes/rules)
State v. Pillot, 115 A.2d 558 (N.J. 1989) (consolidation promotes uniformity and proportionality in sentencing)