STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. KAREEM T. TILLERYÂ (14-06-0084, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), A-0682-15T3

Defendant Kareem T. Tillery was investigated for ~7–8 months after a cooperating informant said he sold firearms; police made controlled buys and recorded phone calls. He was arrested August 22, 2013 and charged with multiple weapons offenses.
Post-arrest, police completed arrest forms and administered Miranda warnings; defendant signed a Miranda card and was interviewed; portions of the interview were transcribed and admitted.
At a pretrial Rule 104 hearing, the trial judge excluded pre-Miranda biographical answers as beyond routine booking but found, under the totality of the circumstances, that defendant’s post-Miranda statements were knowingly and voluntarily made (with limited redactions).
A jury convicted Tillery of second‑degree unlawful possession of a handgun and fourth‑degree unlawful disposition of a weapon; the jury hung on other counts which were later dismissed.
The trial judge imposed a discretionary extended term (persistent offender) on the second‑degree count (20 years with 10 years parole ineligibility) and sentenced concurrently on the fourth‑degree count.
On appeal Tillery challenged (1) admissibility of his custodial statement (Miranda waiver) and (2) the sentence as excessive, arguing the judge relied on facts relating to counts on which the jury did not convict and overemphasized his prior record.

Issue	State's Argument	Tillery's Argument	Held
Whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Tillery waived Miranda rights for his post‑warning statements	The totality of circumstances (warnings given, signed Miranda card, prior experience with police, no coercion) supports a knowing, voluntary waiver	No valid waiver; statements were involuntary or not knowingly waived despite warnings	Affirmed: trial judge’s credibility and totality‑of‑circumstances finding upheld; post‑Miranda statements admissible (with redaction of nickname); pre‑warning biographical info excluded
Whether the sentence was excessive because the judge relied on conduct underlying counts the jury did not convict of and double‑counted criminal history	Court may consider conduct proved by a preponderance (Watts); judge properly considered record, need for deterrence, risk of re‑offense, and legislative gun‑control policy	Judge improperly relied on facts from counts not resulting in conviction and overstated prior record	Affirmed: judge permissibly considered conduct (jury hung, not acquittal), applied aggravating factors lawfully; prior record consideration not a basis for reversal

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Sup. Ct.) (Miranda warning and custodial interrogation framework)
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (Sup. Ct.) (silence plus warnings: uncoerced statements can constitute waiver)
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (Sup. Ct.) (sentencing court may consider conduct underlying acquitted charges by preponderance)
State v. W.B., 205 N.J. 588 (N.J. 2011) (appellate standard deferring to trial court credibility findings on Miranda waiver)
State v. Tindell, 417 N.J. Super. 530 (App. Div. 2011) (sentencing reversal where judge improperly punished defendant for perceived jury error and exhibited moral outrage)