STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MIGUEL Y. TINEO-PAULINO (09-01-0178, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
A-5076-14T1
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | Jun 14, 2017Background
- Blaze Bail Bonds posted a $100,000 commercial bail bond for Miguel Tineo‑Paulino in December 2008; he failed to appear in July 2009 and bail was forfeited and a default judgment entered in October 2009.
- Blaze produced a Dominican death certificate (with an apostille) and obtained vacatur/exoneration in December 2010; county later discovered defendant was alive and arrested on federal charges.
- On November 14, 2012 the court re‑forfeited bail; that order was stayed and later affirmed on appeal in April 2014.
- Blaze filed a second motion in April 2014 to vacate/exonerate; the State threatened sanctions under Rule 1:4‑8 and later moved for a writ of execution on the preexisting judgment and for counsel fees after the indictment was dismissed in October 2014.
- Trial court (Mar. 6, 2015) returned $75,000 to Blaze (remitted 25%), denied the State’s writ and denied counsel fees—finding Rule 1:4‑8 notice defective and invoking equitable tolling of N.J.S.A. 2A:162‑8; State appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether remission/exoneration was inappropriate because defendant never produced and default judgment stands | Remission is improper where fundamental condition (production) never met; nothing shows defendant was ever in custody or judgment vacated | Remission may be appropriate given vacatur, later dismissal, and equitable considerations | Court affirmed discretion to remit but reversed the remission amount as exceeding applicable Schedule 3 maximum; remand for recalculation |
| Whether the trial court misapplied Remission Schedule 3 in setting 25% remission | Even under Schedule 3, facts support only minimal remission (0–10%), not 25% or 75% return to surety | Trial judge relied on Hyers factors and special reason (false death certificate) to justify 25% remission | Court found judge’s factual Hyers analysis sound but his application of Schedule 3 was a legal error; reversed and remanded to recalculate within Schedule 3 limits |
| Whether surety’s claim for return of funds is time‑barred by N.J.S.A. 2A:162‑8 (four‑year limitation) | Surety’s forfeiture occurred in 2009 so claims now time‑barred | Forfeiture was vacated in 2010 and reinstated in 2012; the surety filed within four years of the 2012 forfeiture | Court held surety was not time‑barred; relief sought within four years of the operative forfeiture |
| Whether State is entitled to counsel fees under Rule 1:4‑8 for frivolous litigation | State failed to include required 28‑day withdrawal notice but omission is not consequential; fees should be awarded because second motion was frivolous | Surety had colorable basis (years of litigation, vacatur, eventual dismissal); no bad faith or harassment | Court affirmed denial of fees: strict compliance with Rule 1:4‑8 required and trial court reasonably found no bad faith; denial affirmed on alternate ground |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Ventura, 196 N.J. 203 (establishes Hyers‑factor balancing for bail remission)
- State v. Hyers, 122 N.J. Super. 177 (App. Div. 1973) (sets core Hyers factors for bail remission)
- State v. Mercado, 329 N.J. Super. 265 (App. Div. 2000) (focus on surety’s efforts to secure defendant)
- State v. de la Hoya, 359 N.J. Super. 194 (App. Div. 1999) (considers bond amount and surety steps in remission analysis)
- State v. Harmon, 361 N.J. Super. 250 (App. Div. 2003) (intangible public‑interest injury discussed in remediation context)
- State v. Peace, 63 N.J. 127 (1973) (remission lies in judicial discretion; public‑interest harm weight)
- State v. Singletary, 170 N.J. Super. 454 (Law Div. 1979) (statute’s time limit relates to forfeiture date, not subsequent judgments)
- State v. Toscano, 389 N.J. Super. 366 (App. Div. 2007) (measuring immediacy of surety’s efforts from notice of forfeiture)
- State v. Ruccatano, 388 N.J. Super. 620 (App. Div. 2006) (defining ‘substantial’ and ‘effective’ recovery efforts)
- State v. Franklin Sav. & Loan Assoc., 389 N.J. Super. 272 (App. Div. 2006) (strict compliance with Rule 1:4‑8 prerequisite to fee recovery)
