STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. LARRY AUSTIN (11-03-0410, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
A-5132-14T4
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | May 25, 2017Background
- In 2009 Kevin J. Evans (defendant) shot two people; one died and one survived. He was indicted on murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, and weapons charges.
- In 2010 Evans pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement: Count One amended to first-degree aggravated manslaughter and Count Two to second-degree aggravated assault; State recommended concurrent terms subject to NERA.
- The trial court originally sentenced below the first-degree range to 8 years (Count One) and concurrent 7 years (Count Two); the State appealed the downward sentencing.
- This court reversed and remanded because the court had not applied the statutory downgrading standard (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2)); the judge resentenced Evans to 10 years (Count One) and concurrent 5 years (Count Two), both subject to NERA.
- Evans sought post-conviction relief (PCR) in 2014 arguing excessive sentence and ineffective assistance of counsel for failures at resentencing; the PCR judge (who had been the sentencing judge) denied relief without an evidentiary hearing.
- This appeal challenges denial of PCR, claiming entitlement to a hearing and asserting trial counsel failed to press additional mitigating factors (7, 8, 12) and otherwise perform effectively at resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Evans) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of an evidentiary hearing on PCR was proper | PCR record and filings failed to make a prima facie showing warranting a hearing | Trial counsel ineffective at resentencing; facts supporting inefficiency need development at a hearing | Denial affirmed: defendant failed to show a reasonable likelihood of success; no prima facie case for a hearing |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for not arguing mitigating factors 7, 8, 12 | Additional factors would not change first-prong balancing or provide separate "compelling" reasons for downgrading | Counsel should have argued lack of adult record (7), circumstances unlikely to recur (8), and voluntary surrender/cooperation (12) | No prejudice: court already found mitigating factors 3 and 9 substantially outweighed aggravator; additional factors would not alter result |
| Whether counsel should have argued use of "excess" mitigating factors in the interest-of-justice prong | The Megargel two-prong test does not permit using excess mitigating factors as separate compelling reasons; no recognized legal basis existed to do so | "Excess" mitigating factors could support the second prong and counsel was ineffective for not making that argument | Rejected: adopting defendant’s approach would add a third step to Megargel; counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to predict a change in law |
| Whether counsel failed to reiterate factual defenses (victim threats/shots at defendant) at resentencing | The record and presentence report, and prior sentencing arguments, already placed those facts before the judge | Counsel did not sufficiently re-urge defensive facts at resentencing, which prejudiced mitigation | Rejected: trial counsel had previously argued those facts, the presentence report contained them, and the judge expressly considered them at resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987) (Strickland adopted in New Jersey)
- State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391 (2004) (de novo review of PCR court’s legal conclusions; counsel not ineffective for failing to anticipate unsettled law)
- State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484 (1996) (two-prong standard for downgrading sentences under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2); need for separate, compelling reasons for "interest of justice" prong)
- State v. Lake, 408 N.J. Super. 313 (App. Div. 2009) (compelling reasons for downgrade must arise from offense context and be separate from mitigating factors)
- State v. Read, 397 N.J. Super. 598 (App. Div. 2008) (limitations on the weight of juvenile adjudications and cooperation as a mitigating factor)
- State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89 (1997) (prima facie standard for entitlement to evidentiary hearing on PCR)
- State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583 (2002) (evaluate counsel’s performance by law as it stood at the time of the conduct)
- State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494 (2005) (examples of cooperation that qualify for mitigating factor 12)
