State of New Jersey v. Richard Rivastineo
447 N.J. Super. 526
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.2016Background
- Defendant Richard Rivastineo was indicted on six drug-related counts, including two first-degree counts charging possession with intent to distribute and distribution of "five ounces or more" of heroin and cocaine aggregated together.
- The State aggregated 3.6 ounces of cocaine and 1.8 ounces of heroin seized on different dates to reach the five-ounce threshold for first-degree charges.
- Defendant moved to dismiss the two first-degree counts, arguing the State could not aggregate different controlled substances (heroin + cocaine) to elevate the charge.
- The Law Division (Criminal Presiding Judge Clark) granted the motion, dismissing the two counts on the ground N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(c) permits aggregation only of the same substance, not different substances.
- The State appealed the interlocutory dismissal. The Appellate Division reviewed de novo and affirmed, relying on the statute’s plain language and the rule of lenity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(c) permits aggregation of different drugs (e.g., heroin + cocaine) to meet a statutory weight threshold for a higher-degree offense | Aggregation is permissible because both drugs appear in the same statutory subsection and the State should have discretion to combine quantities to reach first-degree weight | Aggregation is impermissible because the statute’s singular term "substance" and its structure allow aggregation only of the same substance; different drugs must be charged separately | Affirmed: aggregation limited to the same substance; different drugs cannot be combined to reach the higher-degree weight threshold |
Key Cases Cited
- Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366 (statutory interpretation: courts must give effect to Legislature's plain language)
- State v. Jordan, 235 N.J. Super. 517 (App. Div.) (possession of different drugs with intent to distribute constitute separate offenses)
- State v. Shelley, 205 N.J. 320 (statutory interpretation begins with plain language; effectuate legislative intent)
- State v. Sumulikoski, 221 N.J. 93 (rule of lenity applies where criminal statute ambiguous)