State of New Jersey v. Jonathan Zembreski, 138 A.3d 583

Background

At ~3:00 a.m., defendant followed victim from casino to his hotel room, knocked, claimed to be an FBI agent, and gained entry when the victim opened the door after seeing a badge through the peephole.
Once inside, defendant demanded money, ripped the phone from the wall when the victim attempted to call for help, and slammed the door on the victim’s hand as the victim tried to leave, causing injury.
Victim later gave defendant a $500 casino chip and alerted casino security; defendant was arrested and charged by indictment with robbery, burglary, impersonating a law enforcement officer, possession (dismissed pretrial), and theft (reduced).
A superseding indictment added a second-degree robbery count for purposely putting the victim in fear; defendant moved to dismiss that count and declined the court’s offer for extra preparation time.
At the close of the State’s case and after trial, the court denied defendant’s motions for acquittal; the jury convicted on second‑degree robbery (by fear), second‑degree burglary, and impersonating an officer; sentence was 3 years (robbery) with burglary merged.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Validity/timing of superseding indictment returned shortly before trial	Prosecutor had probable cause; re‑presenting to grand jury is within charging discretion; no vindictiveness	Superseding indictment after pretrial was unfair, violated due process, hindered defense	Denied relief: prosecutor may seek superseding indictment pre‑empanelment absent vindictiveness; no abuse of discretion
Whether entry was "licensed/permission" for burglary when consent obtained by deception	Entry obtained by deception is not a lawful license; burglary statute applies when entry exceeds scope of permission	Opening the door constituted permission to enter, so no unlawful entry for burglary	Held: permission obtained by fraud is not a license; deceptive entry may support burglary
Sufficiency of evidence that defendant acted recklessly or purposely caused injury for 2d‑degree burglary	Totality of conduct (following, ruse, ripping phone, slamming door) supports recklessness causing injury	Slamming door could not show knowledge/recklessness because defendant could not have known victim’s hand position	Held: Evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find reckless infliction of injury
Sufficiency of evidence that defendant purposely put victim in fear for 2d‑degree robbery	Conduct (stalking to room, impersonation, threats to career, disabling phone, slamming door, late hour) could purposely create fear of immediate bodily harm	Victim’s fear of losing practice or family didn’t show fear of immediate bodily injury; no explicit threats of bodily harm	Held: Totality of circumstances permitted a jury to find defendant purposely put victim in fear of immediate bodily injury

Key Cases Cited

State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158 (2007) (statutory interpretation—plain meaning controls)
State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216 (1996) (indictment disturbance only for manifest deficiency)
State v. Bauman, 298 N.J. Super. 176 (App. Div.) (1997) (prosecutor’s discretion to seek superseding indictment)
State v. Jones, 183 N.J. Super. 172 (App. Div. 1982) (limits on reindictment tied to double jeopardy and due process concerns)
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (prosecutorial charging discretion)
State v. Gomez, 341 N.J. Super. 560 (App. Div.) (prosecutorial discretion; vindictiveness standard)
State v. Williams, 441 N.J. Super. 266 (App. Div. 2015) (dismissal of indictment is draconian remedy)
State v. Newton, 755 S.E.2d 786 (Ga. 2014) (consent obtained by deception does not negate burglary)