State of New Jersey v. Jean A. Sene, 128 A.3d 175

Background

Defendant Jean A. Sene was driving a taxi when a pedestrian entered the roadway, fell into an adjacent lane, and was fatally run over by a jitney bus. Whether the taxi struck the pedestrian was disputed.
The jitney driver stopped, waited, and gave a statement; Sene left the scene without speaking to anyone, later walking by but not reporting or assisting.
Surveillance and dashcam videos identified Sene’s taxi; experts disagreed on whether the taxi made contact with the victim.
A jury convicted Sene under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 (leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death).
On appeal Sene argued (1) that contact between his vehicle and the victim is a required element, (2) the statute is unconstitutionally vague without that requirement, (3) sentencing errors in weighing aggravating/mitigating factors, and (4) restitution ordered without a hearing.
The court affirmed the conviction, rejected the contact-and-vagueness arguments, but remanded for resentencing (to clarify and properly weigh factors) and for a restitution hearing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether physical contact between defendant's vehicle and the victim is a required element of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1	The State argued the statute penalizes knowingly leaving the scene when a driver is "involved in an accident" that results in death, without requiring direct contact.	Sene argued "involved in an accident" requires contact with the victim and the court should so instruct the jury.	The court held contact is not a necessary element; "involved in an accident" can include conduct that contributes to an accident without direct contact.
Vagueness of "involved in an accident" as applied	The State maintained the phrase gives fair notice and can be applied to conduct that contributed to the fatal event.	Sene argued that absent a contact requirement the statute is unconstitutionally vague and jury needed a definition.	The court held the phrase is not unconstitutionally vague as applied; a person of ordinary intelligence would understand when they were "involved." Court declined to require a special definition.
Jury instruction issue — whether judge erred by instructing jury contact was not required	State defended use of model charge and instruction that contact is not an element.	Sene argued the judge erred by refusing a tailored instruction and by telling jurors to disregard evidence of contact.	The court found no error in the instructions; the model charge and statement that contact is not required were appropriate.
Sentencing and restitution procedure	State conceded restitution hearing required; argued sentencing was within judge's discretion.	Sene challenged the identification and weighing of aggravating/mitigating factors and contested restitution without a hearing.	The court vacated the sentence for resentencing to clarify and properly weigh factors (Fuentes guidance) and remanded for a restitution hearing under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57 (2014) (guidance on resentencing and weighing aggravating/mitigating factors)
State v. Lykes, 192 N.J. 519 (2007) (standard for reviewing jury charges; need for careful instructions)
State v. Lenihan, 219 N.J. 251 (2014) (statutory interpretation principles; legislative intent and plain meaning)
People v. Bammes, 71 Cal. Rptr. 415 (Ct. App. 1968) (construing "involved in an accident" to include conduct connected in a natural/logical manner and rejecting vagueness challenge)
State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355 (2003) (limits on imposing probationary treatment for offenses presumptively requiring imprisonment)