State of New Jersey v. Idris R. Perry, 110 A.3d 122

Background

Seven consolidated appeals challenged indictments under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(a) & (b), which create enhanced criminal penalties for operating a vehicle "during the period of license suspension" when the suspension arose from DWI or refusal convictions.
Defendants had all been previously convicted of DWI/refusal and served court-imposed determinate suspension terms, but were later charged for driving after those determinate terms had expired while they remained administratively suspended (e.g., for failure to pay restoration fees or satisfy other administrative requirements).
Trial courts split: Middlesex County judges dismissed several indictments; other trial courts in Burlington and Ocean Counties denied dismissal in two cases. The State appealed the dismissals and defendants appealed denials as appropriate.
The core legal question became whether N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 criminalizes driving after the expirations of the court-imposed suspension term but before administrative reinstatement by MVC.
The Appellate Division reviewed statutory construction de novo and considered plain language, legislative history, extrinsic authorities, and the rule of lenity.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 applies when a person drives after the court-imposed suspension term has expired but before administrative reinstatement	Statute should be read to extend until license is administratively restored; prosecutions may continue until driver completes administrative reinstatement steps	Statute criminalizes operation only while serving the court-imposed (determinate) suspension; statute is silent as to post-sentence administrative suspension and should not be read to criminalize it	Held: statute applies only to driving during the court-imposed period of suspension, not thereafter
Whether State v. Zalta supports extending the suspension period for criminal prosecution	Relies on Zalta to argue Director/MVC authority to keep license suspended until reinstatement supports prosecutions continuing beyond determinate term	Zalta addressed agency authority in licensing context, not creation/interpretation of a criminal statute imposing mandatory jail; distinguishable	Held: Zalta is inapposite; it concerned administrative/license consequences, not the scope of a penal statute
Whether extrinsic sources (legislative history, policy) show Legislature intended post-term administrative suspension to be covered	State argues penalties and administrative schemes imply continuity until reinstatement	Legislative history repeatedly frames the offense as occurring "while under suspension for" the DWI/refusal offense (i.e., while serving the court-imposed term); plain text does not include post-term administrative suspension	Held: legislative history supports limiting the statute to the determinate suspension term
Whether ambiguity should be resolved for the State or defendants (rule of lenity)	State seeks broader reading to maximize enforcement and deterrence	Any ambiguity in a penal statute must be resolved in favor of the defendant under the rule of lenity	Held: if ambiguity existed, rule of lenity favors defendants; court applies narrow construction in defendants' favor

Key Cases Cited

State v. Carrigan, 428 N.J. Super. 609 (App. Div. 2012) (background on statute's genesis and legislative purpose)
State v. Zalta, 217 N.J. Super. 209 (App. Div. 1987) (addressed Director/MVC authority to extend suspension in licensing context)
State v. Revie, 220 N.J. 126 (2014) (standard: de novo review of statutory construction)
State in Interest of K.O., 217 N.J. 83 (2014) (interpret statutes using ordinary meaning and common sense)
DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (2005) (do not add terms omitted by Legislature)
State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158 (2007) (use plain language; resort to extrinsic sources only if ambiguity remains)
State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439 (2011) (application of rule of lenity when penal statute ambiguous)
State v. Cook, 653 A.2d 829 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (comparable statute construed to apply only during determinate suspension)
State v. Hammerton, 886 P.2d 1012 (Or. 1994) (Oregon statutes read together to limit enhanced penalties to finite revocation period)