State of New Jersey v. Ibrahim J. Eldakroury
108 A.3d 649
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | 2015Background
- Defendant Ibrahim J. Eldakroury was indicted for operating a sexually oriented business (Hott 22) within 1,000 feet of an area zoned for residential use in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:34-7(a).
- At the grand jury, the prosecutor instructed that the State must prove the defendant knowingly operated a sexually oriented business but did not need to prove the defendant knew the business was within 1,000 feet of a residential zone.
- Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the prosecutor's grand jury instruction relieved the State of proving an essential mens rea element (knowledge of location).
- The Law Division judge (Judge Mega) granted the motion, concluding the location is a material element and the State must prove the defendant acted knowingly with respect to that element; the prosecutor’s instruction was "blatantly wrong."
- The State appealed; the Appellate Division reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo and the dismissal for abuse of discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the statute requires proof that defendant knew the business was within 1,000 feet of residential zoning (mens rea as to location) | The State argued knowledge of operating the business sufficed; location is not a mens rea element and strict liability as to location should be read in | Defendant argued location is a material element and the default mens rea (knowingly) applies to each material element, so the State must prove knowledge of location | The court held location is a material element and the State must prove the defendant knew the business was within 1,000 feet of a residential zone (knowingly applies to location) |
| Whether the prosecutor’s grand jury instruction was legally sufficient | The State maintained the instruction was adequate | Defendant contended the instruction was blatantly wrong because it relieved the State of proving mens rea as to location | The court held the instruction was blatantly wrong and warranted dismissal of the indictment without prejudice |
| Whether N.J.S.A. 2C:34-7(a) should be read as imposing strict liability for location because similar statutes do so | The State analogized to drug/school-zone statutes that explicitly impose strict liability for location | Defendant argued those statutes expressly provide strict liability, whereas 2C:34-7(a) contains no such language and cannot be read to impose strict liability | The court rejected the analogy and declined to read strict liability into 2C:34-7(a); legislative silence does not imply strict liability |
| Whether ambiguity about mens rea should be resolved for the defendant (rule of lenity) | The State argued against applying lenity here | Defendant argued that any ambiguity must be resolved in his favor, applying the default "knowingly" standard | The court held that if ambiguous, the rule of lenity supports applying the default knowingly mens rea to each material element |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216 (grand jury dismissal standard and discretion)
- State v. Triestman, 416 N.J. Super. 195 (App. Div.) (prosecutor must correctly instruct grand jury; blatant error warrants dismissal)
- State v. Ball, 268 N.J. Super. 72 (App. Div.) (indictment fails if grand jury instructions are misleading)
- State v. McDonald, 211 N.J. 4 (rule of lenity and mens rea interpretation)
- State v. Gelman, 195 N.J. 475 (mens rea construction principles)
- State v. McCrary, 97 N.J. 132 (standard for appellate review of indictment dismissal)
- Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Util. Co., 212 N.J. 576 (courts should not read into statutes language the Legislature omitted)