State of New Jersey v. L.A., 433 N.J. Super. 1

Defendant (L.A.) was convicted in 2003 of aggravated sexual assault, endangering the welfare of a child, and aggravated sexual contact based on allegations by his daughter L.N. covering three incidents (Nov. 2000 at home, Dec. 2000 at a motel, Feb. 2001 in a car). Sentence imposed with Megan’s Law and lifetime supervision.
At trial the State called L.N. and her mother; defendant testified and denied the assaults. Defense attempted to call defendant’s wife (D.A.) but the trial court barred her because she had not been disclosed before jury selection.
On PCR defendant argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and timely disclose D.A. and son L.H., who would have given exculpatory testimony (D.A. said she and L.H. were home the day of the November incident and that L.N. had prior behavioral/credibility problems).
A PCR judge initially found counsel deficient but concluded defendant suffered no prejudice because there were other incidents; this court remanded for an evidentiary hearing to allow D.A. to testify and for fuller analysis.
On remand the PCR judge found D.A. generally credible but denied relief, reasoning a jury would likely credit L.N. over the interested witness D.A. and that other incidents supported conviction; defendant appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (L.A.)	Held
Whether trial counsel's failure to interview and call D.A. and L.H. prejudiced defendant under Strickland	No reasonable probability of a different outcome; jury convicted on multiple incidents so excluded testimony as to one incident would not have created reasonable doubt	D.A. and L.H. would have corroborated defendant and undermined L.N.'s credibility generally; their absence prejudiced the defense	Court reversed PCR denial: prejudice shown — reasonable probability jury would have had reasonable doubt had witnesses testified
Whether the PCR court properly assessed credibility and applied the Strickland prejudice standard	PCR court properly concluded jury would likely discredit an interested witness and the conviction was supported by other incidents	PCR court focused incorrectly on which witness was "more credible" instead of whether testimony could have undermined confidence in outcome	Court held PCR judge erred by comparing credibility alone; court must consider totality of evidence and whether absent testimony could produce reasonable doubt

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two‑part ineffective assistance test and the "reasonable probability" prejudice standard)
State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451 (adopts the Strickland standard for New Jersey PCR claims)
State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (discusses ineffective assistance standards)
State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127 (evidentiary rule cited re: impeachment/remoteness)
McCauley‑Bey v. Delo, 97 F.3d 1104 (absent witness credibility is relevant to Strickland prejudice analysis)
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523 (Pa.) (clarifies credibility assessment for Strickland prejudice—focus on reasonable probability jury would credit new evidence)
Avery v. Prelesnik, 548 F.3d 434 (6th Cir.) (discusses limits of PCR court credibility determinations)