State of New Hampshire v. William Ramsey
166 N.H. 45
| N.H. | 2014Background
- Defendant William Ramsey convicted after jury trial of second-degree assault, reckless conduct with a deadly weapon, kidnapping, and criminal threatening for violently assaulting his girlfriend in December 2010.
- Victim testified Ramsey strangled and beat her with a curling iron, shoved it into her throat causing loss of consciousness and prolonged impairment of her voice; defendant sent threatening texts afterward.
- Physical and medical evidence (bruises, laceration, impaired voice) and eyewitness testimony corroborated the victim’s account; defendant admitted to choking, slapping, and confronting her and to sending aggressive texts.
- At trial defense sought to cross-examine the victim about an alleged false statement on her 2010 driver’s license renewal and objected to admission of testimony that Ramsey treated the victim’s dog well.
- Defendant challenged imposition of consecutive sentences for second-degree assault and reckless conduct with a deadly weapon as violating the common-law merger doctrine.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Ramsey's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether excluding cross-examination about an alleged false driver’s-license statement violated evidentiary rules and confrontation rights | Any error was harmless given overwhelming evidence | Exclusion violated Rules 403 and 608(b) and Confrontation Clauses | Assuming error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; verdict unaffected |
| Admissibility of testimony that defendant treated the victim’s dog well | Evidence was admissible and not prejudicial | Testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial | Trial court did not abuse discretion; any relevance concerns did not prejudice defendant |
| Whether consecutive sentences for assault and reckless conduct violate merger/common-law double punishment principles | Distinct elements required different proof; consecutive sentences permissible | Sentences improperly merged under Young and common-law merger doctrine | Offenses required proof of different facts; no merger, consecutive sentences lawful |
| Whether Young controls merger analysis generally | Young limited to its facts; merger analyzed using double jeopardy principles | Young should prevent consecutive sentences here | Court limited Young to its facts and applied double jeopardy/merger framework, finding no merger |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Beede, 156 N.H. 102 (harmless-error standard and burden on State)
- State v. Goodale, 144 N.H. 224 (impeachment and credibility impact)
- State v. Young, 159 N.H. 332 (discussion of merger between related charges; limited to facts)
- State v. McKean, 147 N.H. 198 (merger analysis where different elements require different proof)
- State v. Farr, 160 N.H. 803 (lesser-included offense analysis)
- Tarrant v. Ponte, 751 F.2d 459 (1st Cir. 1985) (distinguishing double-description vs. unit-of-prosecution multiple punishment cases)
- Com. v. Anderson, 650 A.2d 20 (Pa. 1994) (equating merger and double jeopardy inquiry for single-act multiple punishments)
