State of Missouri v. Marvin D. Rice, 573 S.W.3d 53

Background

Marvin Rice was charged with first-degree murder (Annette Durham) and second-degree murder (Steven Strotkamp) after he went to Durham’s home to retrieve his son, forced entry, and shot both victims; a child witness identified Rice and a third party also named him.
Rice was involved in a high-speed flight, shot by police at a hotel, and while hospitalized was read Miranda rights, twice invoked his right to remain silent, was re-contacted by detectives (with breaks) and later gave statements after a morning rereading of Miranda.
At trial the court admitted portions of his hospital interrogation over Rice’s motion to suppress; the prosecution also elicited testimony that Rice refused to answer some questions.
Rice requested MAI-based instructions on second-degree murder (including a negation of sudden passion) and voluntary manslaughter for Strotkamp’s death; the court refused both; jury convicted Rice of second-degree murder (Strotkamp) and first-degree murder (Durham).
During the penalty phase for Durham, the prosecutor referred to Rice as the “13th juror” and said, in effect, the State could not ask him questions; defense objected and moved for mistrial; objection overruled.
Post-trial Rice appealed, arguing (1) instructional error (denial of voluntary manslaughter and modified second-degree instructions), (2) Miranda violations/admission of post-invocation statements, (3) due-process/Doyle violation by use of post-Miranda silence, and (4) impermissible penalty-phase comment regarding his failure to testify.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Rice)	Held
Whether court erred by refusing voluntary manslaughter instruction for Strotkamp	No: evidence insufficient to show sudden passion arising from adequate cause	Yes: testimony and Rice’s statements showed provocation (threat to keep son, contemporaneous assault by both victims, fear of weapon) sufficient for manslaughter instruction	Reversed: evidence supported sudden passion; voluntary manslaughter instruction should have been given
Whether court erred by refusing MAI-form second-degree instruction that negates sudden passion	No: not warranted absent sufficient evidence of sudden passion	Yes: since voluntary manslaughter instruction was required, the MAI second-degree instruction with a sudden-passion negation was required	Reversed as to Strotkamp conviction; prejudice presumed from instruction error
Whether admission of statements after Rice invoked silence (Miranda) violated Fifth Amendment	No: later voluntary statements and breaks cured earlier invocations; earlier admissions harmless	Yes: Rice made clear, unambiguous invocations (“I don’t wanna talk no more,” “I got nothing to say”) and police failed to scrupulously honor them; some statements were elicited in violation	Court found Miranda violations for statements made after invocations but before a proper break/rereading; errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as those statements added little and similar admissions occurred after proper rereading
Whether prosecutor’s “13th juror” remark at penalty phase impermissibly referenced Rice’s silence/refusal to testify	No: rhetorical device referring to voir dire; not a comment on not testifying	Yes: functional equivalent of comment on defendant’s failure to testify; direct reference that invited jury attention	Court held remark impermissible and prejudicial; penalty-phase portion vacated and a new penalty trial ordered for Durham

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (accused must be warned and interrogation must cease upon invocation of right to silence)
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (post-Miranda silence may not be used to impeach or incriminate defendant)
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (ambiguous or equivocal invocations do not require interrogation to cease)
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (factors for determining whether subsequent interrogation after invocation is permissible)
State v. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d 390 (Mo. banc 2014) (defendant-entitled lesser-included instruction standard; prejudice presumed if required instruction not given)
State v. Thomas, 161 S.W.3d 377 (Mo. banc 2005) (instructing on lesser included offense when doubt exists; evidence viewed in light most favorable to defendant)
State v. Creighton, 52 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. 1932) (initial assault and battery by victim can support manslaughter instruction)
State v. Fears, 803 S.W.2d 605 (Mo. banc 1991) (aggregate provocations may support sudden passion finding)
State v. Brooks, 304 S.W.3d 130 (Mo. banc 2010) (Doyle analysis and harmless-error framework for due-process violations)
State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. banc 1998) (defendant’s invocation of rights must be scrupulously honored)