State of Missouri v. Demetrick Taylor
2015 Mo. LEXIS 145
Mo.2015Background
- Police officers observed Demetrick Taylor walking by parked cars at night, chased him when he ran, and testified they saw him remove and throw a plastic bag over a fence; officers retrieved a bag containing 1.78 grams of crack cocaine.
- Taylor was charged with possession of a controlled substance as a prior and persistent drug offender; jury convicted him after trial.
- Defense proffered witness Nautica Little to testify she saw events after the arrest (Taylor handcuffed), that George Ford (her fiancé) was outside, that she began videotaping and an officer seized her phone, and that officers searched Ford’s vehicle and the lot. The defense did not claim she saw the throw or chase.
- Trial court excluded Little’s testimony as irrelevant/hearsay/improper impeachment; Taylor raised the exclusion in a post-verdict motion (denied) and appealed.
- Taylor also argued the court denied meaningful allocution by stating its intended sentence before he spoke; court had heard a motion for new trial, had a sentencing assessment report, and considered a letter submitted on Taylor’s behalf before sentencing to 16 years.
Issues
| Issue | Taylor's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Little’s testimony | Little’s testimony was relevant to show officers lied and that police, not Taylor, were the source of the drugs | Little lacked firsthand knowledge of the chase/throw/retrieval; testimony was hearsay or cumulative and not probative of possession | Exclusion was not an abuse of discretion: testimony lacked direct relevance, would be hearsay or cumulative, and was improper impeachment |
| Contradiction/impeachment use of Little’s testimony | Her testimony would contradict officers on who was present and on officers seizing her phone, undermining credibility | Officers did not testify to the contrary on those specific points; Little would not actually contradict material facts | Not admissible for contradiction/impeachment; contradictions were collateral or speculative and did not materially undermine officers’ testimony |
| Use of Little’s statement about phone seizure as impeachment (consciousness of guilt) | Seizure shows officer dishonesty/consciousness of guilt and impeaches veracity | Phone seizure (after arrest) is minimally probative of planting evidence and not an established impeachment method | Exclusion proper: act of seizing a phone post-arrest is not a recognized form of impeachment relevant to proving planting of evidence |
| Denial of meaningful allocution / sentencing practice | Announcing intended sentence before allocution denied due process and right to present mitigating evidence | Court had heard motion for new trial, had sentencing report and a letter, and allowed counsel and defendant to speak; Rule 29.07(b)(1) makes allocution directory after a new-trial hearing | No plain error: Rule 29.07(b)(1) makes allocution directory when defendant was heard on a motion for new trial; record shows mitigating materials were before court and defendant was heard |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Winfrey, 337 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. banc 2011) (abuse-of-discretion review for admissibility of evidence)
- Mitchell v. Kardesch, 313 S.W.3d 667 (Mo. banc 2010) (limits on extrinsic impeachment and collateral-matter analysis)
- State v. Clark, 364 S.W.3d 540 (Mo. banc 2012) (evidentiary error reviewed for prejudice affecting outcome)
- State v. Collings, 450 S.W.3d 741 (Mo. banc 2014) (definition of logical relevance)
- Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301 (U.S. 1961) (right of allocution; court should afford defendant opportunity to speak)
- Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (U.S. 1962) (failure to allow allocution is not jurisdictional or constitutional error requiring automatic reversal)
- State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. banc 1994) (discussing allocution and related constitutional considerations)