State of Missouri v. Daaron Harris, 477 S.W.3d 131

Background

Naaron (Daaron) Harris was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, burglary, and two counts of armed criminal action; sentenced to life without parole plus consecutive and concurrent long terms. Harris did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.
Victim was shot to death in an apartment; forensic evidence indicated multiple firearms were used; eyewitnesses saw two men leaving, one with a long gun.
Harris was arrested months later; detectives read Miranda rights, Harris signed a waiver, and gave a videotaped confession admitting he retrieved a rifle from a gangway and fired into the apartment after being threatened.
At trial Harris testified his confession was coerced, he was intoxicated and grieving, detectives threatened his brothers, and he only confessed to secure release; detectives denied threats and said Harris understood rights and answered voluntarily.
During deliberations one juror (Juror No. 1975) told the judge she was "nervous and scared" and indicated she did not believe guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt; the court questioned her in open court, instructed her to follow jury instructions (including not deciding out of fear), and sent her back to deliberate. Jury later returned unanimous guilty verdicts.
Post-trial Harris sought to contact Juror 1975 and moved for new trial; court denied. On appeal Harris challenged (1) court's ex parte inquiry/instruction to juror and denied mistrial, (2) denial of suppression of his statements, (3) admission of portions of his videotaped statement and other evidence, (4) denial of his request to proceed pro se, (5) admission of a photo of the victim holding a puppy, and (6) denial of post-trial contact with Juror 1975. The court affirmed on all points.

Issues

Issue	State's/Respondent's Argument	Harris's/Appellant's Argument	Held
1) Court's private inquiry of juror and denial of mistrial (coerced verdict)	Court questioned juror in open court with counsel present to explore fear; instructed juror to follow jury instructions and not decide from fear; no coercion occurred.	Court singled out juror, pressured her to conform to other jurors and coerced a guilty verdict; mistrial required.	No abuse of discretion; inquiry was in open court, addressed juror's fear, did not coerce a verdict.
2) Motion to suppress confession (voluntariness / Miranda waiver)	Harris was advised of Miranda, signed waiver, composed himself, answered coherently for ~2 hours; no threats, prolonged coercion, or deprivation; waiver voluntary.	Harris was intoxicated (Percocet, marijuana), sleep- and food-deprived, grieving, requested counsel and was threatened about his brothers; confession involuntary.	Denial of suppression affirmed; totality of circumstances supports knowing, intelligent, voluntary waiver.
3) Admission of videotaped statement excerpts and related evidence (uncharged acts/propensity)	Statements (youth services, being shot at, hidden gun, nickname denial, attempted drug purchase) were contextually relevant to events and identification, not unfair propensity evidence; probative value outweighed prejudice.	Portions were prejudicial prior-bad-act evidence or irrelevant and should be redacted; prejudiced jury.	Admission not an abuse; statements formed part of the sequence of events or identification and any references were too vague to be prejudicial.
4) Denial of request to proceed pro se / replace counsel	Court conducted inquiry; defendant sought a new lawyer, not an unequivocal request to represent himself; at trial court reasonably found waiver of counsel not knowing and intelligent and denied request.	Harris reasonably sought to proceed pro se or get new counsel late in proceedings; denial prejudiced his defense.	Denial affirmed; request to proceed pro se was equivocal and untimely, so Faretta right not triggered.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Ward, 242 S.W.3d 698 (Mo. banc 2008) (mistrial standard and trial court discretion)
Boedges v. Dinges, 428 S.W.2d 930 (Mo. App. E.D. 1968) (communications between court and jury must be in open court with counsel)
State v. Dodd, 10 S.W.3d 546 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999) (distinguishing permissible inquiry from coercion of verdict)
State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. banc 1998) (burden and standards for voluntariness review on suppression)
State v. Faruqi, 344 S.W.3d 193 (Mo. banc 2011) (totality of circumstances test for involuntary confessions)
State v. Mateo, 335 S.W.3d 529 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) ("will overborne" standard)
State v. Kemp, 212 S.W.3d 135 (Mo. banc 2007) (abuse of discretion and prejudice in evidentiary rulings)
State v. Harris, 870 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. banc 1994) (uncharged crimes admissible when part of sequence of events)
State v. Nettles, 10 S.W.3d 521 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999) (use of nicknames for identification)
State v. Johnson, 943 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997) (Faretta/self-representation standards)
State v. Black, 223 S.W.3d 149 (Mo. banc 2007) (unequivocal request requirement for pro se)
Strong v. State, 263 S.W.3d 636 (Mo. banc 2008) (post-trial juror contact and limits on juror testimony)
State v. Babb, 680 S.W.2d 150 (Mo. banc 1984) (jury verdicts speak for jurors; post-verdict juror impeachment generally barred)
State v. Carter, 955 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. banc 1997) (juror testimony may not impeach unanimous verdict)
State v. West, 425 S.W.3d 151 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) (exceptions for juror testimony limited to extrinsic evidence or overt bias)