STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. DUSTIN M. HICKS, 501 S.W.3d 914

Dustin M. Hicks was convicted by a jury of attempted first-degree rape, second-degree assault, and armed criminal action arising from an arranged meeting with a prostitute.
Trial court sentenced Hicks as a prior and persistent offender to consecutive 10- and 12-year terms and a concurrent 3-year term.
Immediately after jurors were sworn, the judge announced he permits juror questions in some cases but—after counsel approached—declined to allow juror questions in this criminal trial; defense moved for a mistrial which the court denied.
During polling after an initial guilty verdict, Juror No. 9 stated the verdicts were not her verdicts; the court sent the jury back to deliberate, provided new verdict forms for the non-unanimous counts, and later received unanimous guilty verdicts on re-polling.
Jury asked during deliberations (after being sent back): what to do if unable to reach a unanimous verdict, and whether an alternate could replace a juror unwilling to vote; the court answered only that it could give no further instructions.
Hicks appeals arguing (1) the court’s comments about juror questions and refusal to permit them prejudiced the jury and warranted mistrial, and (2) the court should have declared a mistrial sua sponte because jury deliberations became contentious and may have produced a coerced verdict.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether judge’s pretrial remarks about permitting juror questions and then telling jurors they could not ask questions required a mistrial	State: Court’s remarks were procedural, neutral, and followed by instructions; no prejudice shown	Hicks: Remarks signaled jurors that defense prevented them from questioning, prejudicing defense	Court: No abuse of discretion; remarks were procedural, not indicative of bias, and curative instructions were given; defense did not request a specific curative instruction or object when court spoke to jury
Whether trial court’s conduct after a juror disavowed the verdict and later contentious deliberations required sua sponte mistrial for jury coercion	State: Resumption of deliberations and limited jury questions are normal; disagreement is inherent and permitted by instructions	Hicks: Juror’s disavowal and later questions show coercion or taint making verdict unreliable	Court: No plain error; coercion requires court conduct that effectively directed a verdict or unlawfully pressured jury; disagreement and heated deliberation alone do not prove coercion

State v. Harris, 477 S.W.3d 131 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (mistrial is drastic remedy; reviewed for abuse of discretion)
State v. McClendon, 477 S.W.3d 206 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (abuse-of-discretion standard for trial-court conduct)
State v. Koonce, 731 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (trial judge must avoid conduct prejudicing jury against defendant)
State v. Thomas, 791 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (judge may correct counsel or clarify as long as not expressing opinion on facts)
State v. Clay, 763 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (judge may question witnesses to clarify but must remain neutral)
State v. Saunders, 318 S.W.3d 745 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (definition of a coerced verdict—court virtually directing verdict or indicating it will hold jury until verdict)
Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448 (U.S. 1926) (trial-court inquiry into jury division risks improper influence)
State v. Steed, 455 S.W.3d 479 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (coerced verdict error recognized)
State v. McNail, 767 S.W.2d 84 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (verdict must be overturned if coerced by court)
State v. Rojano, 519 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (same principle regarding coerced verdict)
State v. Copple, 51 S.W.3d 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (hammer instruction encourages frank deliberation and possible change of opinion)