State of Missouri, Plaintiff/Respondent v. Leland Hughes, 2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 828

On Nov. 21, 2012, Leland Hughes and co-defendant Shawn Borders invaded Bryan Richardson’s apartment, bound victims, stole property, and, according to the victims, Hughes raped T.A. at gunpoint.
Borders pleaded guilty and testified for the State but initially refused to answer questions implicating Hughes on both direct and cross; after the judge threatened contempt and a break, Borders eventually implicated Hughes on cross and recanted/contradicted prior statements.
Physical evidence linked Hughes to the crime: a gun and victim-name shirts were recovered from the defendants’ car, Hughes’s DNA was found on a glove left in the apartment, and witnesses (including T.A.) identified Hughes in photo and live lineups.
Hughes was convicted after a two-day bench trial of first-degree burglary, first-degree robbery, two counts of kidnapping, five counts of armed criminal action, and one count of forcible rape; total effective sentence was 43 years.
On appeal Hughes argued (1) the trial court erred by refusing to strike Borders’s testimony—violating his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights—and (2) insufficient evidence supported the rape and accompanying armed-criminal-action convictions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Hughes)	Held
Whether the court erred in denying motion to strike co-defendant Borders’s testimony (Confrontation Clause)	Borders’ testimony was admissible; he ultimately answered on cross and defense had a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine.	Calling Borders’ testimony into evidence violated Hughes’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights because Borders repeatedly refused to answer and immunity/invocation issues prevented meaningful cross-examination.	Court: No error — cross-examination was not unreasonably limited; Borders eventually implicated Hughes on cross.
If admission of Borders’s testimony was constitutional error, whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt	Any error was harmless because overwhelming independent evidence (victim IDs, DNA, physical items, step-grandfather’s ID) supported conviction.	The improper admission prejudiced Hughes and thus cannot be harmless.	Court: Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given strong independent evidence.
Sufficiency of the evidence for forcible rape and related armed criminal action	Victim T.A. had opportunity to observe, gave consistent identifications (photo and live lineups), and described distinct acts by each assailant; a reasonable trier could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.	Evidence was insufficient to prove Hughes (rather than Borders) committed the rape.	Court: Sufficient evidence; convictions affirmed.

United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1963) (unreasonable limits on cross-examination may require reversal)
State v. Blair, 638 S.W.2d 739 (Mo. banc 1982) (adopting Cardillo principles re: witnesses invoking privilege)
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988) (Confrontation Clause guarantees a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine, not perfect effectiveness)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (federal constitutional error harmless only if harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
State v. Hornbuckle, 769 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. banc 1989) (identification testimony admissible unless procedure is so suggestive as to create substantial likelihood of misidentification)
State v. Bowman, 337 S.W.3d 679 (Mo. banc 2011) (standard for reviewing denial of judgment of acquittal/sufficiency review)
State v. Conrick, 375 S.W.3d 894 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (factors for assessing reliability of identification testimony)