State of Missouri ex inf. Charles J. Dykhouse, Boone County Counselor in his Official Capacity v. City of Columbia, Missouri
2017 Mo. App. LEXIS 30
| Mo. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Boone County Counselor Charles J. Dykhouse filed a quo warranto petition (Feb 2014) seeking to bar the City of Columbia from implementing any new TIF projects for at least five years, alleging the City failed to comply with TIF Act reporting (§ 99.865) and thus lost authority under § 99.865.7.
- The City had created three TIF projects since 2009; by 2014 two were operational and a proposed downtown TIF effort was abandoned in Feb 2014 after county objections.
- Dykhouse filed in his official capacity, asserting authority under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 56.640.3 (mutual cooperation agreement with the prosecuting attorney) and Rule 98.02 relator provisions.
- The trial court found City violated reporting duties and entered an ouster judgment preventing new TIFs through Dec. 31, 2019.
- On appeal the Western District considered multiple points but disposed of the case on two dispositive grounds: (1) Dykhouse lacked authority to bring quo warranto when he filed, and (2) quo warranto is not the proper remedy to challenge an improper exercise of an otherwise lawful power.
- Court reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss; it also explained that § 99.865.7 is not self-executing and that quo warranto targets usurpation of powers, not wrongful exercise of granted powers.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authority to bring quo warranto (standing/relator) | Dykhouse: § 56.640.3 + mutual cooperation with prosecutor authorized him to file in his name | City: Rule 98.02 required Attorney General or prosecuting attorney; county counselor lacked authority | Held: Dykhouse lacked authority at filing; Rule 98.02 (then) controlled and relator status is jurisdictional — dismiss |
| Effect of § 56.640.3 on Rule 98.02 | Dykhouse: § 56.640.3 expands who may prosecute civil actions, so it permits county counselor to be relator | City: Legislature did not amend Rule 98.02 or § 531.010; § 56.640.3 did not change quo warranto procedure | Held: § 56.640.3 did not amend Rule 98.02; legislature did not follow constitutional amendment procedure; § 56.640.3 did not authorize quo warranto relator status then |
| Whether § 99.865.7 is self-executing (automatic loss of TIF authority) | Dykhouse: failure to report automatically prohibits municipality from implementing new TIFs for ≥5 years | City: Statute requires enforcement/action; prohibition not automatic | Held: § 99.865.7 is not self-executing; passive phrasing requires an outside enforcement mechanism |
| Appropriateness of quo warranto to remedy reporting noncompliance | Dykhouse: quo warranto can oust City for usurping a power it no longer has under § 99.865.7 | City: Quo warranto targets usurpation, not improper exercise of lawful power; reporting lapse is remedied otherwise | Held: Quo warranto unavailable here — it cannot be used to correct wrongful exercise of an otherwise lawful power |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Lake St. Louis v. City of O’Fallon, 324 S.W.3d 756 (Mo. banc 2010) (quo warranto relator authority and public-interest nature of ex officio filings)
- State ex rel. Collector of Winchester v. Jamison, 357 S.W.3d 589 (Mo. banc 2012) (distinguishing procedural rule vs. substantive rights; rules govern filing machinery)
- State ex rel. Nixon v. Kinder, 89 S.W.3d 454 (Mo. banc 2002) (quo warranto unavailable to challenge continued exercise of an existing power wrongly or for too long)
- State ex rel. Rouveyrol v. Donnelly, 285 S.W.2d 669 (Mo. banc 1956) (police power cannot be delegated and relator authority must be conferred by law)
- State ex rel. Schneider’s Credit Jewelers v. Brackman, 272 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. banc 1954) (relator authority is required at the outset; jurisdictional requirement)