State of Minnesota v. Xa Vang, A15-1922

At 3:15 a.m., Deputy Suchy observed Xa Vang driving irregularly, administered field sobriety tests, and arrested him after observing signs of intoxication and discovering a revoked license.
At the jail, Suchy read the implied-consent advisory in English; Vang repeatedly responded, “Need a Hmong translator,” and alternated between saying he wanted an attorney and declining to call one.
Over roughly 25 minutes, Suchy asked multiple times whether Vang would submit to a breath test; Vang never expressly said "no" but repeatedly insisted he needed an interpreter and did not provide a breath sample.
A jury convicted Vang of second-degree test refusal but acquitted him of driving while impaired. Vang appealed on multiple grounds.
The district court admitted the implied-consent peace officer’s certificate into evidence and limited the defense from arguing an affirmative defense of "reasonable refusal."

Issue	State's Argument	Vang's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence of refusal	Circumstantial evidence (words/actions) show volitional unwillingness to submit to testing	Requests for an interpreter did not equal refusal; limited English meant no meaningful refusal	Evidence sufficient; conviction affirmed
Ability to argue "reasonable refusal" defense	Reasonableness is not an element of the criminal refusal statute; jury was allowed to hear interpreter/understanding evidence	District court’s pretrial ruling barring argument of reasonable refusal violated right to present a defense	No abuse of discretion; jury instructions (and permitted testimony) adequately covered defendant’s theory
Admissibility of implied-consent certificate (hearsay)	Certificate duplicative of deputy’s testimony and was admissible as prior consistent statement or otherwise harmless	Certificate is a police form containing inadmissible hearsay; admission erred	Admission error, if any, was harmless—document was cumulative and did not substantially influence verdict
Constitutionality of criminal test-refusal statute	N/A at trial; state implicitly defends statute	Statute violates due process and the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine by criminalizing refusal to a warrantless search	Issue forfeited by failure to raise below; in any event would fail under Birchfield and controlling Minnesota authority

State v. Ferrier, 792 N.W.2d 98 (Minn. App. 2010) (refusal may be inferred from words and actions under totality of circumstances)
State v. Hagen, 529 N.W.2d 712 (Minn. App. 1995) (failure to respond can constitute refusal where driver capable of refusing)
State v. Al‑Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469 (Minn. 2010) (standards for reviewing circumstantial‑evidence convictions)
State v. Johnson, 672 N.W.2d 235 (Minn. App. 2003) (affirmative defense instruction on reasonable refusal reviewed for abuse of discretion)
State v. Olmscheid, 492 N.W.2d 263 (Minn. App. 1992) (noting incorporation of implied‑consent provisions into refusal context but declining to decide scope)
State v. Bakken, 604 N.W.2d 106 (Minn. App. 2000) (prior consistent statements admissible under rule 801(d)(1)(B) with threshold credibility inquiry)
State v. Sanders, 775 N.W.2d 883 (Minn. 2009) (harmless‑error standard for evidentiary rulings that do not implicate constitutional rights)
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (U.S. 2016) (limits on criminalizing refusal to submit to certain warrantless blood tests; relevant to constitutionality arguments)