State of Minnesota v. Thomas Joseph Shane, 883 N.W.2d 606

Shane, a township supervisor and canvassing-board member, took ballots from a Wanamingo township election and burned them about two months later; state law requires ballots be retained for 22 months.
He testified he did not know the retention law and claimed he received statements at meetings suggesting he could discard the ballots.
Charged with one count of ballot destruction (Minn. Stat. § 204C.06, subd. 4(b)) and one count of misconduct of a public officer; jury convicted on ballot-destruction count and acquitted on misconduct.
District court ruled ballot destruction is a general-intent crime and excluded jury instructions on mistake of law and (for that count) reliance on an official government statement; it allowed such instruction for the misconduct count.
Shane appealed, arguing the court erred on the mental-state classification, denied his requested defenses, and improperly ruled on jury instructions after close of evidence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Is ballot-destruction a general- or specific-intent crime?	Shane: statute requires specific intent; mistake-of-law defense should apply.	State: statute criminalizes conduct "intentionally" and contains no knowledge-of-law element → general intent.	Court: General-intent crime; statute language supports general intent.
2. Should jury be instructed on mistake-of-law for Count I?	Shane: mistake of law should be allowed given unfamiliar election procedures and his role.	State: mistake of law is not a defense to a general-intent crime.	Court: No abuse of discretion in refusing the instruction.
3. Should jury be instructed on reliance on official government statement for Count I?	Shane: he relied on statements from local officials and a former clerk; instruction warranted.	State: no prima facie evidence of an affirmative official assurance authorizing destruction.	Court: Although defense can apply to general-intent crimes, Shane failed to make a prima facie showing; instruction properly denied.
4. Was the court’s timing in ruling on jury instructions improper?	Shane: instruction rulings were central and should have been made earlier.	State: court may rule before or after argument and did so before closing argument.	Court: No abuse of discretion; timing was permissible under the rules.

State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2012) (distinguishes general- vs. specific-intent language)
State v. Cole, 542 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1996) (review standard for refusal to give jury instruction)
State v. Lopez, 587 N.W.2d 26 (Minn. 1998) (defendant entitled to instruction if evidence supports theory)
State v. Whitten, 690 N.W.2d 561 (Minn. App. 2005) (official-statement reliance can bar prosecution; due-process protection)
McKown v. State, 475 N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 1991) (government may not authorize conduct and then prosecute)
Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (U.S. 1959) (due-process bar where government official appears to authorize conduct)