State of Minnesota v. Thomas Raymond Struzyk
869 N.W.2d 280
| Minn. | 2015Background
- Deputy Kadlec went to Struzyk’s home to arrest him on a warrant; a confrontation ensued and the deputy tased Struzyk.
- After being tased, Struzyk smeared a small amount of his blood (from a probe wound) onto the deputy’s uniform and said, “This is for you.”
- Struzyk was charged with three counts: (1) felony fourth-degree assault of a peace officer (transfer of bodily fluids), (2) gross-misdemeanor fourth-degree assault (physical assault theory), and (3) gross-misdemeanor obstruction.
- The district court instructed the jury using a pattern instruction that treated intentional transfer of bodily fluids as the felony assault without requiring a separate physical-assault element.
- The jury convicted on the felony transfer-of-bodily-fluids count and obstruction, but acquitted on the gross-misdemeanor physical-assault count.
- On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court the issue was whether subdivision 1 of Minn. Stat. § 609.2231 requires proof of a physical assault in addition to intentional transfer of bodily fluids.
Issues
| Issue | Struzyk's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether subdivision 1 treats intentional transfer of bodily fluids as an independent felony or as an enhancement to a physical assault | The statute requires proof of a physical assault; transfer of fluids only elevates a misdemeanor assault to a felony when it satisfies assault elements | Transfer of bodily fluids alone is a per se felony assault (no separate physical-assault element required) | The transfer-of-fluids clause is an enhancement to the physical-assault offense; the State must prove a physical assault in addition to intentional transfer. |
| Whether intentional transfer of fluids automatically meets the legal definition of bodily harm | Not argued as primary; contends assault element necessary | Transfer may risk disease and thus constitute bodily harm or assault as a matter of law | Rejected: potential infectiousness does not automatically satisfy legal bodily-harm requirement; assault must be proven. |
| Whether the district court’s jury instruction error was harmless | Implied that omission invalidated conviction or required clarification | Argued the pattern instruction was correct and conviction stands | Instruction omission of physical-assault element was prejudicial; reversal and new trial on the felony count (subject to double-jeopardy limits) required. |
| Whether retrial on the felony count is barred by double jeopardy because of acquittal on the misdemeanor count | Argued acquittal precludes retrial of related charge | contended counts were factually distinct allowing retrial on post-Taser conduct | No double jeopardy bar: acquitted conduct (pre-Taser) differed factually from conduct underlying the felony (post-Taser smear), so retrial permitted. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Kelley, 734 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (court of appeals previously held transfer of fluids alone can constitute felony assault)
- State v. Hayes, 826 N.W.2d 799 (Minn. 2013) (statutory interpretation standards; plain-meaning review)
- State v. Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. 2012) (definite article "the" as a limiting/reference word in statutory text)
- State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358 (Minn. 2011) (instructional error requiring reversal unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (omission of an element from jury instructions is constitutional error unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
- State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675 (Minn. 2007) (prejudice analysis for erroneous jury instructions)
- State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2012) (distinguishing assault-harm and assault-fear definitions)