State of Minnesota v. Robin Lyne Hensel
2016 Minn. App. LEXIS 6
| Minn. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Robin Lyne Hensel, a regular attendee at Little Falls city council meetings, brought and wore protest signs and twice moved her chair into the area between the public seating and the council dais at a June 7, 2013 meeting.
- After being asked twice to return to the public-seating area, Hensel partially moved back, refused further requests, argued with officials, and was removed by police; the council could not start the meeting on time.
- Hensel was charged under Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(2) for disturbing a lawful meeting, pleaded not guilty, and moved to dismiss on First Amendment and vagueness/overbreadth grounds; the motion was denied.
- At trial, Hensel requested jury instructions limiting conviction where conduct was expressive and requiring "fighting words" or separability of speech and conduct; the court refused and used pattern disorderly-conduct instructions.
- A jury convicted Hensel; the district court denied judgment of acquittal and sentenced her to stayed jail time and probation. Hensel appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hensel) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Statute facially violates First Amendment as vague/overbroad | § 609.72(1)(2) reaches protected speech/expressive conduct and is not narrow enough; requires narrowing to fighting words | Statute is content-neutral, targets conduct disturbing meetings and is constitutionally valid | Statute is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad; survives time/place/manner and O’Brien analysis |
| 2. Jury instructions — expressiveness/fighting-words requirement | Jury should be instructed that if conduct was expressive only, conviction requires finding of fighting words; and conviction permissible only if nonprotected expression is separable from conduct | Law does not require fighting-words narrowing for conduct-based disturbance; separability is not required | Trial court did not abuse discretion; requested instructions misstated the law |
| 3. Sufficiency of evidence to convict | Conduct was expressive protest; evidence insufficient to show intent to disturb or actual disturbance | Hensel moved forward, refused repeated instructions, argued, delayed start of meeting — supports intent and disturbance | Evidence, viewed favorably to verdict, was sufficient to support conviction |
| 4. (Threshold) Whether First Amendment implicated | Hensel claims her acts were expressive and thus trigger First Amendment review | State contends statute does not reach speech/expression | Court finds statute’s language can encompass speech/expressive conduct, so First Amendment concerns are implicated |
Key Cases Cited
- Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (articulates standard for permissible time, place, manner restrictions)
- Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (First Amendment does not guarantee communication at all times/places)
- United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (test for incidental burdens on expressive conduct)
- Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (facial invalidation inappropriate where statute covers identifiable constitutionally proscribable conduct)
- Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2014) (facial vs. as-applied challenge standards under Minnesota law)
- In re Welfare of S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1978) (narrowing statute to fighting words when language penalizes protected speech)
- State v. Krawsky, 426 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. 1988) (upholding conduct-focused interference statute as not vague)
- State v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 1998) (overbreadth in broader harassment statute distinguished)