State of Minnesota v. Robert John Meyers, 869 N.W.2d 893

Appellant Robert John Meyers stabbed victim A.C. in a Minneapolis parking ramp; victim suffered severe abdominal injury, lost ~40% of blood, required emergency surgery and six-day hospitalization.
Meyers was convicted by jury of first-degree assault; acquitted of criminal sexual conduct; jury deadlocked on kidnapping.
State sought upward durational departure under the "repeat offender" aggravating factor (Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D.2.b(3) / Minn. Stat. § 244.10, subd. 5a(a)(3)), which applies when the current offense involves victim injury and defendant has a prior felony for criminal sexual conduct or an offense involving victim injury.
Jury separately found Meyers intentionally injured the victim and that he had a prior sexual-abuse conviction (stipulated via certified record).
District court imposed an upward durational departure to the statutory maximum of 240 months, citing the repeat-offender factor and particular cruelty; Court of Appeals affirmed; Minnesota Supreme Court granted review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the repeat-offender aggravating factor may support an upward departure when it overlaps the victim-injury element of the offense	State: Legislature authorized the factor; it may be applied even if it overlaps elements	Meyers: Factor impermissibly duplicates the injury element (double-counting) per Peterson/Erickson	Held: Valid. The factor requires a prior qualifying conviction (a fact not required to prove first-degree assault), so its application does not violate Peterson/Erickson and may support departure.
Whether the 240-month upward durational departure was an abuse of discretion	State: Departure justified by repeat-offender factor and facts; sentence within permissible range (less than double)	Meyers: Departure exaggerates criminality, conduct not significantly worse than typical first-degree assault, and court relied on "particular cruelty" without jury findings or notice	Held: No abuse. Repeat-offender factor alone can justify up to a double durational departure; although some cruelty findings lacked jury notice, remand unnecessary because a valid ground justified the sentence.

State v. Peterson, 329 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1983) (departure cannot be based on facts the legislature used to define offense severity)
State v. Erickson, 313 N.W.2d 16 (Minn. 1981) (caution against double-counting a prior conviction in both criminal-history and as a departure ground)
State v. Peake, 366 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1985) (upholding repeat-offender departure where current and prior offenses involved victim injury)
State v. Lindsey, 314 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. 1982) (upholding repeat-offender departure in armed-robbery context)
State v. McIntosh, 641 N.W.2d 3 (Minn. 2002) (caution against using elements such as drug quantity as additional aggravators when they duplicate the offense elements)
State v. Thompson, 720 N.W.2d 820 (Minn. 2006) (invalidating departure reliance on loss-amount subfactor that duplicated offense elements; upholding other nonduplicative subfactors)
Neal v. State, 658 N.W.2d 536 (Minn. 2003) (concern about exaggeration/double-counting where very large departures imposed without severe aggravators)