State of Minnesota v. Jacob Miles Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618

Jacob Solberg pleaded Norgaard to third-degree criminal sexual conduct (use of force/coercion) after trial testimony showed he was intoxicated and forcibly penetrated the victim despite repeated refusals.
The presumptive sentencing range under the Minnesota Guidelines was 53–74 months; the State capped its recommendation at 53 months.
At sentencing Solberg sought a downward dispositional or durational departure, relying on youth, family support, cooperation, and documented expressions of remorse.
The district court rejected a dispositional departure but granted a downward durational departure to 30 months, citing those mitigating factors including remorse.
The court of appeals reversed the durational departure, holding the non-remorse factors were only dispositional and that remorse did not relate back to make the offense less serious or permit a durational departure alone.
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review to decide (1) whether a single mitigating factor can justify a downward durational departure and (2) whether Solberg’s remorse sufficed here.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a single mitigating factor may justify a downward durational departure	Solberg: A single mitigating factor (remorse) can suffice to support a durational departure	State: Multiple or specific offense-related factors are required; single mitigating factors have not supported durational departures	A single mitigating factor may support a downward durational departure if it provides an identifiable, substantial, and compelling reason — i.e., it shows the conduct was significantly less serious than typical for the offense
Whether remorse alone justified Solberg’s downward durational departure	Solberg: His documented remorse made his conduct less serious and warranted a shorter sentence	State: Remorse is generally an offender-characteristic relevant to dispositional, not durational, departures; Solberg’s remorse did not lessen offense seriousness	Remorse does not justify a durational departure unless it relates back and diminishes the seriousness of the criminal conduct; Solberg’s remorse did not do so, so the durational departure was improper
Whether the district court’s other cited factors could support durational departure	Solberg: Youth, family support, cooperation contributed to diminished offense seriousness	State: Those are offender-characteristics relevant to disposition only	Age, family support, cooperation are dispositional factors and cannot justify a durational departure

State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712 (Minn. 1994) (describing Norgaard pleas)
State v. Hicks, 864 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. 2015) (single aggravating factor can support upward durational departure)
State v. Lomax, 437 N.W.2d 409 (Minn. 1989) (repeat-offender aggravation may support upward durational departure)
State v. Chaklos, 528 N.W.2d 225 (Minn. 1995) (durational departures must reflect offense seriousness, not offender characteristics)
State v. Mattson, 376 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1985) (durational departure justified when conduct is significantly less serious than typical)
State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. 1982) (dispositional departures focus on offender characteristics like remorse and support)
State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2014) (remorse is relevant to dispositional departures)
State v. McGee, 347 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 1984) (lack of remorse generally not a durational factor but may relate to cruelty/seriousness in exceptional cases)