State of Minnesota v. Donald Joseph Hall, Jr.
2016 Minn. App. LEXIS 82
Minn. Ct. App.2016Background
- Donald Hall left five hostile, expletive-filled voicemail messages for B.R., the city clerk, in the middle of the night after disputes over utility bills and neighborhood issues.
- Voicemails included personal insults, references to investigations, veiled threats of physical harm, references to "my peoples" who could "make it happen," and demands that B.R. resign and leave town.
- B.R. testified she was "shocked and terrified" and called the police after hearing the messages.
- Hall was charged under Minn. Stat. § 609.749 (stalking), subdivision 2(4) (repeated telephone calls/texts knowing they would cause fear/intimidation).
- District court denied Hall’s motion to dismiss; a jury convicted him and, due to a prior stalking conviction, he received a felony sentence.
- On appeal Hall argued subdivision 2(4) is facially overbroad and unconstitutional as applied under the First Amendment; he also argued insufficient evidence supported the conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Hall's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Is Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 2(4) facially overbroad under the First Amendment? | Subdivision criminalizes speech via calls/texts and could chill protected communications. | Statute targets conduct causing actual fear and requires knowledge; does not sweep a substantial amount of protected speech. | Not facially overbroad. The statute targets intimidating conduct with knowledge and actual harm requirements. |
| 2) Is subdivision 2(4) unconstitutional as applied to Hall’s voicemails? | His messages were expression of frustration/petitioning the government, protected by the First Amendment. | Voicemails amounted to threats/fighting words and were not about public issues; thus unprotected. | Not unconstitutional as applied; messages were unprotected (threats/abuse) and frightened victim. |
| 3) Did the evidence suffice to prove Hall knew or should have known his repeated calls would frighten the victim and that they did? | Five messages alone do not prove he knew they would frighten B.R.; she did not testify fear was caused by number of calls. | Content plus repetition can be considered together; jury could infer Hall’s knowledge and victim’s fear from messages. | Evidence was sufficient. Content and context established knowledge and victim’s fear. |
| 4) Did Hall preserve/vindicate other constitutional claims (vagueness/right to petition)? | (Pro se) Raised vagueness and right to petition arguments. | These issues were not properly preserved/voicemail content was unprotected. | Court declined to consider vagueness claim not presented below; right-to-petition did not immunize threatening/harassing speech. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 1998) (invalidated an overbroad catchall harassment provision and explained limits on regulating speech on matters of public concern)
- State v. Stockwell, 770 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. App. 2009) (upheld a stalking provision as balanced and limited; instructive on construing stalking laws)
- Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (established categorical exceptions to First Amendment protection, including "fighting words")
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (defined "true threats" as unprotected speech conveying intent to commit violence)
- R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (discussed limits of categorical exceptions and importance of content neutrality)
- United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2012) (noted overbreadth challenges rarely succeed against laws not specifically targeted at speech)